

# Implementing the Women, Peace, and Security Resolutions at the DPKO

The Role and Restraints of the DPKO staff

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## Abstract

*Why have the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations had so much difficulty implementing the Security Council Resolutions on Women, Peace, and Security, despite the UN's rhetorical commitment to this agenda? Activists and supporters of the Resolutions blame bias against gender issues, organizational inertia and a lack of political will in the organization itself. Influenced by international relations and sociological theory, I question whether organizational change and discrepancies between rhetoric and practice in international organizations can be explained without considering how stakeholders outside the organizations, and especially member states, influence and place restrictions on the actions of the DPKO and its staff. I try to explain the contradiction between rhetorical commitment and practical implementation through an empirical analysis of how the group responsible for coordinating this implementation process at the DPKO worked to change attitudes and practices relating to these Resolutions in their own organization and in the military aspects of peacekeeping missions, and what factors and actors they considered to be constraining or aiding them in their effort. My findings show that stakeholders from other parts of the UN organization, peacekeeping missions and especially the member states permeate the implementation process at the DPKO and that representatives from all these groups initially had strong reservations against certain aspects of the Resolutions. Advancing the agenda consequently implied changing attitudes, culture and practices not only within the DPKO, but also among the member states and military personnel in peacekeeping missions. The DPKO team coordinating the implementation process worked strategically to achieve this, but also had to rely on the efforts of allies supporting their efforts. While the team has made some progress, the implementation process is not yet over, and realizing implementation in practice will rely on the coordinated efforts of the DPKO team and its allies.*

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## **Acronyms**

C34	The UN Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations
CEDAW	The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women
CIMIC	Civil-Military Cooperation
DFS	Department of Field Support
DPKO	Department of Peacekeeping Operations
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
IO	International Organization
IR	International Relations
MONUC	The United Nations Mission in DR Congo
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NUPI	Norwegian Institute of International Affairs
OMA	Office of Military Affairs
PCC	Police Contributing Country
PRIO	International Peace Research Institute, Oslo
TCC	Troop Contributing Country
UN	United Nations
UNIFEM	United Nations Development Fund for Women
UNSCR	United Nations Security Council Resolution

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# **1. Introduction**

Why have the United Nations (UN) Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) had so much difficulty implementing the Security Council Resolutions on Women, Peace, and Security, despite the UN's rhetorical commitment to this agenda? I try to explain this discrepancy through an empirical analysis of how the group responsible for coordinating this implementation process at the DPKO worked to change attitudes and practices relating to these Resolutions in their own organization and in the military aspects of peacekeeping missions, and what factors and actors they considered to be constraining or aiding them in their effort.

## **1.1 Gender in War and Violent Conflict**

Understanding how violent conflict is experienced differently by men, women, girls and boys is important to ensure that peacekeeping efforts effectively help all parts of war-torn societies, by catering to the potentially different needs of men and women. Civilians are increasingly being targeted in violent conflicts and this violence is often gendered (Anderlini 2007, Carpenter 2006, Mazurana et al. 2005, Solhjell 2010); while women are disproportionally raped, forced into sexual slavery or prostitution, impregnated against their will or intentionally afflicted with HIV/AIDS and other sexually transmitted diseases (Mazurana et al. 2005: 2), men and adolescent boys are more often massacred by warring parties (Carpenter 2006). Many of the atrocities committed primarily against women have up until very recently been perceived as unavoidable by-products of war, which have resulted in lax measures to prevent violations and punish perpetrators.

Gender tends to affect not only how people are victimized, but also how they participate in, recover and benefit from war and violent conflict (Mazurana et al. 2005: 15). However, this is also influenced by socio-economic status, age, ethnicity and other factors. Moreover, the social roles and expectations ascribed to gender vary historically and culturally. Even so, how gender influences the experience of war is

often discerned through stereotypes (Carpenter 2006). Women are for instance often grouped together with children as passive, innocent victims of war. In reality women are also instigators, combatants and perpetrators in many violent conflicts (Mazurana et al. 2005, Carpenter 2006). A consequence of these misperceptions is that women are often excluded from formal decision making processes, as well as from disarmament, demobilization and reintegration efforts aimed at former combatants in the aftermath of war. They are also underrepresented in high-level positions in formal decision making bodies directing the priorities of peacekeeping and peace-building efforts, such as the UN.

To ensure that all civilians are protected in violent conflict and that the perspectives and experiences of both women and men are taken into account in conflict prevention and peace-building efforts, gender must be included as one of the variables for analysis and engagement in peacekeeping and peace-building efforts, a process referred to as *gender mainstreaming* (Mazurana et al. 2005, Anderlini 2007). According to the International Labor Organization, gender mainstreaming is meant to “combat the direct or indirect consequences of past discrimination” of women or men by “enabling them to participate in and benefit equally” (Anderlini 2007: 200) from projects designed by, for instance, the UN. Because the violence directed primarily at women has until recently been largely ignored and women at the same time are barred from the formal fora for conflict prevention and resolution, gender mainstreaming of peace and security efforts focus on measures to both protect and empower women (Anderlini 2007).

## **1.2 Gender Mainstreaming of the Peace and Security Agenda**

As a part of the effort to gender mainstream their work within the realm of peace and security, the UN Security Council has adopted four Resolutions (UNSCRs) on Women, Peace and Security. UNSCR 1325 (2000), UNSCR 1820 (2008), UNSCR 1888 (2009) and UNSCR 1889 (2009) have all been central in placing gender perspectives on the international peace and security agenda. They also represent a formal

recognition of the distinct perils of women during war and conflict. UNSCR 1325 and 1889 contain a wide variety of mandates aiming at protecting and empowering women in violent conflict and its aftermath. This includes demanding protection of all civilians against sexual and gender based violence and encouraging women's participation in peace processes (Tryggestad 2009). UNSCR 1820 and 1888 are more specifically focused on combating sexual violence. For the UN, the Women, Peace, and Security Resolutions mean that the Resolutions' central tenets must be included into all relevant procedures of the organization, which implies making changes in its organizational structure, practice and culture.

The initial Resolution, UNSCR 1325, was adopted after a massive lobbying campaign by an international alliance of women's, peace and human rights organizations, cooperating with women's advocates within the UN system and a group of benevolent member states (Cockburn 2007, Tryggestad 2009). Both the Global North and South<sup>1</sup> were represented among these member states, most notably Bangladesh, Jamaica, Canada, Namibia and the UK (Anderlini 2007, Cockburn 2007). The Resolution was a significant achievement; it was the first time the UN Security Council engaged in gender issues. The alliance remained active after this initial victory, lobbying member states and the UN to implement the Resolution (Tryggestad 2009, Cockburn 2007, Anderlini 2007).

### **1.3 Criticism of the UN's Implementation Process**

Despite the three subsequent Resolutions adopted since UNSCR 1325, members of the advocacy network from various non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and former members of the UN gender staff have voiced criticism of what they see as a lack of effectiveness and substance characterizing the implementation process at the UN. They hold that while the organization continues to express a commitment to the Women, Peace, and Security agenda, there is a stark difference between the

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<sup>1</sup> The Global North denotes the socio-economically wealthy countries of the world, mostly located in the northern hemisphere, including countries in North America and Europe, as well as Australia and New Zealand. The Global South refers to the poorer countries primarily located in the southern hemisphere (Wikipedia 2010).

organization's rhetoric and practice (Tryggestad 2009). This discrepancy, they argue, is a result of organizational inertia, the absence of institutional coherence, as well as bias against gender equality and a lack of political will in the organization itself (i.e. Raven-Roberts 2005). The critics of the implementation process, in other words, ascribe these problems mostly to internal characteristics of the UN.

#### **1.4 Alternative Explanations**

More general theoretical perspectives on discrepancies between rhetoric and practice and organizational change in International Organizations (IOs) suggest that this explanation is incomplete. These theoretical perspectives hold that stakeholders outside the organizations, and especially member states, must be included in an explanation of organizational change and differences between rhetoric and practice in IOs. Some of these theories question whether the organizations themselves have any influence on these kinds of processes at all. Other theoretical perspectives hold that IOs have some degree of autonomy and may initiate and drive organizational change. But while these perspectives differ on the extent to which they can work, they all agree that member states can influence and place restrictions on the actions of IOs and their staff. Several of the perspectives, however, fail to take the agency of IO staff sufficiently into consideration, and treat their actions as determined by either the interests of the member states or organizational culture. Contrastingly, the potential agency of UN staff in implementing the Women, Peace, and Security Resolutions, which necessarily implies changing parts of the organization's structure, culture and practice, is the primary focus of this thesis.

#### **1.5 Scope & Limitations**

When examining the process of implementing this agenda at the UN and the role of the organization's staff, I have chosen to focus on just one part of the UN: the DPKO, and on one specific aspect of the Resolutions: the training of military peacekeepers. I chose this narrow focus because several of the theoretical perspectives on

discrepancies between rhetoric and practice in IOs argue that IOs such as the UN should not be analyzed as a unitary structure. The UN is comprised of numerous units and individuals with distinct agendas and interests and the various parts of the organization have different relationship with outside actors, such as member states and NGOs. Generalizing from the implementation process at the DPKO to other parts of the UN may therefore be imprudent.

Two reasons informed the choice of the DPKO. Firstly, the DPKO is considered to have come the “furthest in implementing Resolution 1325” of the UN organizations (Tryggestad 2009). This is despite the conservative culture and low number of women in UN military contingents, which many of my initial informants among Norwegian scholars and bureaucrats argued would make implementing the Resolutions among the UN military contingents especially challenging. Moreover, military peacekeepers remain formally employed by their respective troop contributing countries (TCCs) while being deployed in UN peacekeeping missions. This makes the TCCs very much involved in the process of implementing the Women, Peace, and Security Resolutions among military peacekeepers and makes this an illustrative point regarding if and how the member states direct the actions of UN staff. The DPKO is consequently a theoretically interesting case, as this employment structure and the level of the member states’ involvement could potentially limit the staff’s influence over the implementation process. This would make any evidence of their influence all the more convincing. On the other hand, the DPKO’s distinct relationship to the UN member states also makes it less comparable to the implementation processes in the other parts of the UN system. For the critics of the implementation process addressing the UN system as a whole, I will therefore only be able to show variation.

The second reason for choosing the DPKO was that the implementation of the Resolutions in peacekeeping operations was mentioned specifically in much of the critical literature, which made me curious about how the implementation process looked from the perspective of those who were criticized. With reference to these critics, I will consider what and who might have influenced the implementation process at the DPKO and consequently whether the blame for what they consider to be

a slow and unsubstantial implementation process can accurately be placed only on internal features of the UN.

## **1.6 Research Question**

The aim of this thesis is accordingly to understand how the effort to implement the Women, Peace, and Security Resolutions at the DPKO is perceived from the perspective of one group of the Department's staff who work to implement this agenda, and how member states, other stakeholders and circumstances influence their efforts. One part of the implementation process at the DPKO was to create the DPKO/DFS Gender Guidelines<sup>2</sup>, which are to guide the implementation of the Women, Peace and Security Resolutions in the work of the UN military peacekeeping personnel (DPKO/DFS 2010). It is the descriptions of the formal processes and the perceptions of the staff working to develop the guidelines that form the primary empirical focus of this thesis. More specifically, how the DPKO staff perceives and describes the strategies they use to develop and eventually implement the guidelines, but also how their relationship with other actors within and without the UN system aids and constrains their efforts and what they see as the reason for this. Against this background, my empirical research questions become the following:

- What strategies did the team responsible for coordinating the implementation of the Women, Peace and Security Resolutions at the DPKO employ in their effort to implement this agenda in the work of military peacekeepers?
- What contextual issues and actors did they see as constraining or aiding them in their effort?

Answering these questions will be one contribution to an explanation as to why the DPKO and the UN more generally have so much difficulty implementing the Women, Peace, and Security Resolutions, despite the organization's rhetorical commitment to this agenda. However, my thesis is also meant to be a contribution to the theoretical

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<sup>2</sup> Interchangeably referred to as DPKO/DFS Gender Guidelines, the military gender guidelines, the gender guidelines or simply the guidelines.

debate about the role and independence of IO staff to initiate and drive organizational change. The empirical research question is therefore also an effort to answer a theoretical research question:

- In which ways are the actions of DPKO staff influenced by the interests of member states and to what extent are they independent social actors?

## **1.7 Methodology**

In order to answer my research questions, I conducted interviews with seven former and current members of the DPKO Gender Team and The Office of Military Affairs (OMA) at the UN headquarters in New York who at the time of writing were in the final stages of developing the DPKO/DFS Military Gender Guidelines. These were chosen precisely because the staff was completing them as my interviews took place, and their memories and opinions of the development process were still relatively fresh. The interviews were carried out during a research trip to New York in February/March 2010 and later over the telephone. In addition, I interviewed eight Norwegian scholars, bureaucrats and diplomats working either directly with the DPKO or with the UN more generally on gender issues. This was both in order to gather background information before my research trip and in order to validate my findings from the interviews at the DPKO. I also analyzed the finished DPKO/DFS Gender Guidelines to see how they compared to the findings from the interviews.

## **1.8 Thesis Outline**

Following this introduction, I will present the arguments and conclusions of the critics of the implementation process in more detail, before introducing the DPKO and outline the formal structure of its relationship to member states. In chapter three I will put this in a wider theoretical context, based on an eclectic approach to International Relations (IR) theory and organizational sociology. In chapter four, I give an account of my methodological choices and challenges, as well as the epistemological foundation of this thesis, before analyzing the empirical data I have collected in



chapter five. I will finally discuss my findings in context of the theoretical perspectives and critical literature in chapter six, before stating my conclusions.

## **2. Putting Gender on the Peacekeeping Agenda: An Overview**

The Resolutions on Women, Peace, and Security (UNSCR 1325, 1820, 1888 and 1889) are related to a wider effort of gender mainstreaming in the UN and its peace operations, which dates back two decades. The Resolutions build on earlier achievements such as the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) and the later UN World Conferences on Women. The initial Women, Peace, and Security Resolution was the result of the aspirations and efforts of an international alliance of women's and human rights activists. The alliance was comprised of everything from large, multinational NGOs to local groups from war-torn societies, cooperating with personnel from various UN agencies and a group of benevolent member states, (Tryggestad 2009, Cockburn 2007, Anderlini 2007).

After succeeding in their lobbying campaign to get gender issues on the Security Council's agenda, the alliance turned its focus to promoting the implementation of the Women, Peace, and Security agenda at the UN and among its member states. This was necessary because while the member states are obliged to implement the Resolutions their "implementation [...] cannot be enforced, and noncompliance cannot be penalized" (Anderlini 2007: 196). The alliance also continued their efforts to recruit supporters and build legitimacy around Women, Peace, and Security issues. The most central of the international organizations in the alliance, including Amnesty International, International Alert and the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, formalized this effort by forming the "Ad Hoc Working Group on Women, Peace and Security", which was to have a watchdog function with regards to the implementation process (Anderlini 2007).

The alliance was successful in their effort to build support for the agenda: in the years after UNSCR 1325, the attention given to the Women, Peace, and Security issues from civil society actors and activists, UN member states and within the UN itself increased

notably (Anderlini 2007). Their work also resulted in the adoption of the three subsequent Women, Peace and Security Resolutions.

<b>RESOLUTIONS ON WOMEN, PEACE, AND SECURITY</b>		
<i><b>Resolution</b></i>	<i><b>Year</b></i>	<i><b>Main Points Related to Peacekeeping</b></i>
UNSCR 1325	2000	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Protecting civilians against sexual and gender based violence</li> <li>• Incorporate gender perspectives in peacekeeping</li> <li>• Women’s participation in conflict prevention, peacekeeping and peace-building efforts</li> </ul>
UNSCR 1820	2008	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Focus specifically on combating sexual violence</li> <li>• Training programs and gender guidelines to help military and civilian peacekeepers to prevent and respond to sexual violence</li> <li>• Requests TCCs and PCCs to take measures against sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers</li> <li>• TCCs and PCCs requested to deploy more female peacekeepers</li> </ul>
UNSCR1888	2009	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Reaffirms and concretizes UNSCR 1820</li> <li>• Stresses coordination and cooperation among UN agencies</li> <li>• New Special Representative on Sexual and Gender Based Violence</li> <li>• “Women Protection Advisers” in missions where they are needed</li> </ul>
UNSCR 1889	2009	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Reaffirms UNSCR 1325</li> <li>• Statement of intention to include gender issues in peacekeeping mandates</li> <li>• Stresses the need to gather reliable data on sexual violence and gender issues</li> </ul>

Table 2.1: Summary of the Women, Peace, and Security Resolutions

## 2.1 Outline of the Resolutions

UNSCR 1325 has three principal goals. First, it states a commitment to women’s rights and highlights the need to protect civilians, especially women and girls, from

gender based violence, including sexual violence. Second, it stresses the importance of women's participation in peacekeeping, peace-building and conflict prevention. This includes increasing women's representation at all levels of the national, regional, and international institutions involved in these processes, such as the UN. Third, the resolution holds that all phases of UN peacekeeping and peace-building processes must incorporate a gender perspective, for instance in the training of peacekeepers and in disarmament, demobilization, reintegration (DDR) efforts in post-conflict countries (Tryggestad 2009, Cockburn 2007). To achieve this, the Security Council urges the member states to expand their "voluntary financial, technical and logistical support for gender-sensitive training efforts" (UNSCR 1325, 2000).

The second resolution, UNSCR 1820 (2008) was, like UNSCR 1325, unanimously adopted and focuses specifically on combating sexual and gender based violence. Concerning the implementation in UN peacekeeping operations, the resolution requests that the responsible UN branches and relevant states "develop and implement appropriate training programs for all peacekeeping and humanitarian personnel". It also urges the troop and police contributing countries (TCCs and PCCs) to take appropriate action to prevent sexual exploitation and abuse by UN peacekeepers and inform their contingents about their responsibility to protect civilians against sexual violence. They are also asked to deploy more female peacekeepers if possible. The Resolution also requests the UN, through the Secretary General, to develop guidelines and strategies to aid UN peacekeepers to prevent and respond to sexual violence. UNSCR 1888 (2009) reaffirms many of the provisions of the previous resolution. It also lauds the DPKO's efforts to develop gender guidelines for military peacekeepers and operational guidance to both military, civilian and police components of UN peacekeeping operations. The Security Council specifically encourages UN agencies involved in implementing the Women, Peace, and Security agenda to cooperate with each other. This coordination process is to be managed by a new Special Representative on Sexual Violence in Conflict who is also mandated to advocate the agenda to central stakeholders, such as member states and warring parties. Margot Wallström was appointed to this position in January 2010 and has a two-year mandate

(UN Multimedia 2010). The Security Council also states an intention to include protection against and response to sexual violence in the mandates of peacekeeping operations, and to sending “women protection advisors” to peacekeeping missions where they are needed.

UNSCR 1889 (2009) reaffirms the central provisions of UNSCR 1325, and stresses the need to gather reliable data on these issues. The Security Council furthermore “expresses its intention, when establishing and renewing the mandates of United Nations missions, to include provisions on the promotion of gender equality and the empowerment of women in post-conflict situations”.

## **2.2 Criticism: Unsubstantial Resolutions and Slow Implementation**

As the Women, Peace and Security agenda gathered momentum scholars and activists from the NGO community, as well as proponents formerly working at the UN, have criticized UNSCR 1325 for being too muted in its demands and the UN for being too slow in implementing its central tenets.

### **2.2.1 Criticism of the Substance of the Resolutions**

Central participants in the NGO network, such as Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom and scholars such as Whitworth (2004), opposed the lack of antimilitarist articles in the resolution and worried that rather than promoting women’s participation as a goal in itself and contributing to a demilitarization of UN peacekeeping, it would be nothing more than a tool to help the UN do its job better. Implementation efforts have moreover often led to stereotyping women as inherently peaceful and thereby invaluable to conflict resolution or prevention, cementing the view that women in war are only helpless victims in need of protection (Whitworth 2004: 136). Furthermore, while calling attention to the need for gender equality, the resolution was considered too cautious in its demands, as it did not address “men and masculinity as the causes of women’s insecurity” (Felicity Hill, quoted in Cockburn

2007: 148). Many activists and academics criticize also the subsequent Resolutions on Women, Peace, and Security along similar lines. In particular, they emphasize UNSCR 1820's and 1888's exclusive focus on the need for protection against sexual violence, without establishing strong links to empowerment as a possible source of prevention<sup>3</sup>.

Other critics are more concerned with what they perceive as the slow pace of implementation in the UN organization. They also argue that what little progress has been made has needed persistent lobbying by activists within and without the UN system (e.g. Anderlini 2007, Porter 2007, Raven-Roberts 2005, Whitworth 2004). Porter (2007) is rather vague in explaining this apparent lack of progress. Other critical accounts often blame it on a combination of a "lack of political will and accountability mechanisms, along with organizational inertia and discriminatory attitudes toward women" (Tryggestad 2009: 541). Anderlini (2007) and Raven-Roberts (2005) offers the most elaborate explanations, and I will therefore go into their analysis in some detail below.

### **2.2.2 Organizational Critique**

Anderlini (2007) begins by her critique of the rate of implementation by placing the Women, Peace and Security Resolutions in a wider context of normative, international questions that influence the implementation process among the member states. She claims that the Resolutions do not easily fit within either a "human security" paradigm or a more state-centric view of peace and security. The "human security" perspective argues that wars are now primarily intrastate conflicts, in which civilians are often the primary targets of the warring parties. This in turn calls for comprehensive international involvement in the protection of civilians and addressing the root causes of war and conflict. The latter perspective champions the pre-eminence of the state and non-intervention (Anderlini 2007). She asserts that this lack of clarity impedes effective implementation, without referring to the criticism and resistance which "human

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<sup>3</sup> This was brought up by four of my informants at the DPKO, as well as two of my interviewees in Norway and referred to as something that divided the proponents of the Women, Peace and Security agenda. Some NGOs, member states and UN branches worried about portraying women as victims, while others welcomed the focus on sexual violence.

security” and the closely related “protection of civilians” agenda met with by many member states (i.e. Chandler 2008, Bellamy & Williams 2010). The traditional principles of peacekeeping holds that missions can only be deployed with the consent of the parties in the conflict, that peacekeepers must remain impartial and that they can only use force self-defense. The proponents of the “human security” and “protection of civilians” paradigms argue that force must also be used against parties in the conflict if needed to protect other groups, such as humanitarian workers and civilians. This idea gained much acclaim from some member states, the NGO community and within the UN organization, but also faced stark opposition from member states who wanted to uphold the traditional peacekeeping principles. While Anderlini (2007) holds that the Resolutions cannot be directly linked to the “human security” paradigm, many member states perceived them to be, and were consequently skeptical to the Women, Peace, and Security Resolutions (Tryggestad 2010).

Anderlini (2007) continues to argue against some stakeholders’ views that the promotion of women’s empowerment forces a Western agenda on the rest of the world, but concedes that there are still a lot of confusion when it comes to both women’s empowerment and gender mainstreaming and that this confusion hampers effective implementation. However, these objections are slowly becoming less prominent internationally as awareness about the central tenets of the Women, Peace, and Security Resolutions are becoming more common (Anderlini 2007).

When it comes to the implementation process at the UN, several factors hamper the process, according to Anderlini (2007). Gender issues are “ghettoized” by an absence of funding, inadequate data and a lack of coordination between different UN agencies working on gender mainstreaming. Dedicated personnel find themselves marginalized and the wider organization seldom implements or mainstreams their work. The commitment to the Women, Peace, and Security agenda voiced by the organization’s leadership is, accordingly, purely rhetorical. While Anderlini (2007) acknowledges that donor priorities might have an effect on the prominence and nature of measures, she still places most of the blame for a lack of implementation progress in the UN system on the organization itself.

Blaming the slow progress of implementation on internal features of the UN is even more pronounced in Raven-Robert's (2005) analysis of gender mainstreaming in UN peacekeeping operations, an analysis based on her time as a program officer in the UN system. She begins her analysis by pointing to the conceptual coherence problem also highlighted by Anderlini (2007). Different branches of the UN understand concepts such as gender mainstreaming and peacekeeping very differently, and how well new concepts are received depends on how well they fit into the conceptual framework already in place. This has led to a marginalization of the gender agenda, especially within the organizations concerned with security matters, such as the DPKO. Bias against gender issues, based either on a lack of knowledge or outright contention, is a second obstacle to effective implementation. Gender mainstreaming of peacekeeping operations is "dismissed as trivial" (Raven-Roberts 2005: 54) by members of the DPKO personnel and leadership. The large presence of military personnel only aggravates this problem. Raven-Roberts, moreover, finds it "disturbing" that a "military background is somehow considered more appropriate than expertise in conflict resolution, peace studies, community development, international relations, or anthropology" (Raven-Roberts 2005: 54). A third impediment is the organizational structure itself. Donor funding is often short term and employment turnover is high, especially in field offices. Gender training is therefore a laborious and continuous effort. Also, commitment to gender issues is adhered to on paper, but due to insufficient routines for evaluation, the strategies are implemented only by those who think this agenda is important. The organization moreover routinely ignores criticism and critics from within the system are "blacklisted" and "discredited" (Raven-Roberts 2005: 58).

In sum, activists and scholars criticize the Women, Peace, and Security Resolutions for not being radical enough. The UN's commitment to implementing the Resolutions is moreover described as mostly rhetorical. The reasons for the apparent lack of actual change are explained by Anderlini (2007) and Raven-Roberts (2005) as: 1) bias against gender issues among UN staff, based on either ignorance or dissent; 2) organizational features, such as inadequate or short-term funding and high rotation of



personnel; 3) a lack of coordination among the different UN agencies, and 4) the absence of normative consensus among UN departments and member states when it comes to peacekeeping and gender issues. Only Anderlini (2007) includes the UN member states in the latter point. The UN is in other words portrayed as a static structure incapable of changing when it comes to gender issues. While acknowledging that “donor countries” have some influence, the authors mostly attribute the slow rate of implementation of the Women, Peace, and Security Resolutions to internal features of the UN itself. Before commencing on the theoretical perspectives that might offer alternative explanations, I will introduce the organizational structure of the DPKO.

## **2.3 The DPKO**

The implementation of the Women, Peace and Security Resolutions at the DPKO is only one part of the much larger process of implementing this agenda in the entire UN system. As the outline of the Resolutions indicated, the DPKO have a number of tasks in this process, mostly relating to peacekeeping operations. I focus on a specific part of this process, namely the recently completed DPKO/DFS Gender Guidelines (2010), which were developed to operationalize the Resolutions for military peacekeepers and complement earlier gender mainstreaming efforts at the DPKO. In this section, I give a short introduction to the components of the DPKO responsible for the development of the guidelines and the most central parts of the formal decision making structure of the military components of peace keeping missions. For a full organizational map of the DPKO, please see appendix I of this paper.

### **2.3.1 The Role of the DPKO in the UN system**

The DPKO is part of the UN Secretariat, lead by the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations and his office. Its formal mandate is to “plan, prepare, manage and direct UN peacekeeping operations...” (UN Peacekeeping 2009a). The Department also “provides political and executive direction to UN peacekeeping operations, and maintains contact with the Security Council, troop and financial

contributors, and parties to the conflict in the implementation of Security Council mandates” (UN Peacekeeping 2009a). Logistical and administrative functions of peacekeeping operations are the responsibility of the Department of Field Support (DFS), which is another subsidiary body of the UN Secretariat. The DFS is also responsible for conduct and discipline in peacekeeping missions, hereunder investigating allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse by UN peacekeepers, a central mandate of the Women, Peace and Security Resolutions (UN peacekeeping 2008).

### **2.3.2 Gender at the DPKO**

The DPKO’s Best Practices Section, which is a subsidiary of the DPKO’s Policy, Evaluation and Training Division, is responsible for assisting in the development of guidelines for UN peace operations. The section employs experts in fields such as HIV/AIDS, human trafficking and gender, who assist the Department and peacekeeping missions in these areas. The Best Practices Gender Team<sup>4</sup> assists the DPKO with the implementation of the Women, Peace and Security Resolutions (UN Peacekeeping 2009b). They have been responsible for developing the DPKO/DFS Gender Guidelines together with a small team from the DPKO’s Office of Military Affairs. The OMA is managed by the Military Adviser and his staff, and has three subdivisions (UN Peacekeeping 2009c), which in different ways work to operationalize and assemble the military aspects of the mandates for peace operations passed by the Security Council. As the UN has no standing army, this must be done from scratch with each new Security Council Mandate (Bellamy & Williams 2010). *The Military Planning Service* of the OMA develops concepts and plans for the military components of peacekeeping missions (UN Peacekeeping 2009c). They are also responsible for translating the military aspects of Security Council mandates into concrete force requirements<sup>5</sup>, which indicates the size and nature of the military component needed to carry out the mandate. These plans are then sent over to *The*

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<sup>4</sup> Hereafter referred to as the Gender Team or Gender Unit

<sup>5</sup> According to one of my interviewees.

*Force Generation Service*, who is responsible for generating the military peacekeepers and equipment needed from member states contributing troops to UN peacekeeping operations, referred to as TCCs. They also negotiate the terms of deployment for each new peacekeeping mission (Bellamy & Williams 2010). Once the Security Council adopts the official mandate and the force requirement is developed, potential TCCs are officially invited to contribute troops and equipment through their diplomatic missions to the UN. Like the civilian members of UN peacekeeping mission, senior military officers and military observers are employed by the UN. The military troops, on the other hand, remain under the authority of their contributing member states while serving under UN operational command (Bellamy & Williams 2010). The third branch of the OMA is *The Current Military Operations Service* who monitors the implementation of the plans created by *The Military Planning Service* in ongoing missions (UN Peacekeeping 2009c). All three subdivisions were represented in the team developing the gender guidelines<sup>6</sup>.

### **2.3.3 Financing and Generating Troops for Peacekeeping Missions**

The UN member states finance peacekeeping missions and their administration through a combination of mandatory and voluntary contributions (Bellamy & Williams 2010). The member states review and approve the budgets of the DPKO and individual peacekeeping operations through the UN General Assembly's Fifth Committee (UN Documentation 2010). The UN General Assembly, through the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (C34), reviews all aspects of peacekeeping operations, including planning and guidelines, once a year. Member states must, in other words, approve all proposed changes in the DPKO's formal structure or activity. The Special Committee is comprised of 144 member states, primarily former or current contributors of personnel and other resources to peacekeeping operations. Thirteen other member states and a number of IOs are present as observers (UN Peacekeeping 2010)

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<sup>6</sup> According to two of my informants.

There are currently over 100 TCCs, each with differing national military doctrines, capabilities and “historical and cultural ties to the people” in the countries hosting peacekeeping operations (Ahmed et al. 2007: 26). UN peacekeeping operations have also grown in both size and ambitions. These factors have made it increasingly difficult for the Force Generation Service to muster the adequate number and quality of troops (Bellamy & Williams 2010). According to Bellamy and Williams (2010) the DPKO is also caught in a perpetual financial crisis, due to the member states’ unwillingness to sufficiently fund the planning, management and employment of peacekeeping operations.

In this thesis I analyze how the DPKO Gender Unit works to promote the Women, Peace, and Security Resolutions in the work of military peacekeepers and what contextual issues and actors they see as constraining or helping them in their work. This is in order to explain the Department’s difficulties in implementing these Resolutions, despite the UN’s continued rhetorical support of this agenda. The critics of the implementation process introduced in this chapter, point to internal characteristics of the organization itself when explaining this discrepancy between rhetoric and practice. The outline of the formal structure of the DPKO shows that the member states are in charge of the Departments’ funding and have veto power over the its formal strategies. The member states also fund and supply troops and equipment for peacekeeping missions. Interacting and cooperating with the member states is therefore a regular feature in the work of many of the DPKO’s staff. This suggests that an analysis of organizational change in the DPKO without including how the organization and its staff try to influence and are influenced by the UN member states is incomplete. The theoretical perspectives introduced in the next chapter expand on this notion.

### **3. Understanding International Organizations**

As outlined in the introduction, the scholars and activists critical of the implementation process at the UN argue that internal features of the organization itself are the cause of its lack of progress. They describe a UN seemingly impervious to the demands of activists and UN personnel trying to mainstream the Women, Peace, and Security agenda in the organization's formal structure and policy agenda. This explanation assumes that organizational change in the UN can be analyzed by treating the organization as independent from its context and outside actors. The purpose of this chapter is to examine whether theoretical perspectives on organizational change and discrepancies between rhetoric and practice in IOs can offer suggestions toward an alternative explanation as to why the implementation process is moving slowly.

The critics featured in the former chapter argue that gender mainstreaming is particularly difficult to implement in organizational settings. I will not presuppose that this is the case, but rather return to this point in my empirical findings. Instead, I will make use of theoretical perspectives on change in IOs that often do not discuss gender questions explicitly in order to understand gender mainstreaming of the peacekeeping agenda at the UN.

The aim of this chapter is to map out how theoretical perspectives and scholars analyzing organizational change and discrepancies between rhetoric and practice in IOs would explain the slow implementation of the Women, Peace, and Security Resolutions at the DPKO, despite the UN's vocal support of this agenda. In order to do that, two underlying questions must be addressed. First, can the UN and its staff initiate and actualize change in the organization's formal and informal priorities, practices and structure by itself, or are other actors influential in this process? Secondly, if the UN and its staff have the power to create organizational changes, what strategies do they employ to achieve this? I will try to address these two questions in turn, as explained through various theoretical perspectives in IR theory, some of which are heavily influenced by organizational sociology. I then return to the apparent

difference between rhetoric and practice when it comes to the Women, Peace, and Security agenda at the UN.

### **3.1 Change in International Organizations**

The question of which actors and factors determine change in IOs has divided IR scholars for a long time and in this section I outline the central theoretical perspectives on this subject. It is important to note, however, that these theoretical perspectives do not represent unitary schools of thoughts; scholars identifying themselves with the different theoretical perspectives I outline might disagree over parts of the theoretical framework. For the sake of argument and clarity, I introduce some of the central features that are common within important IR theories, but this is not an in-depth analysis of these theories, and nuances and debates within and between each theoretical perspective will not be included.

The question of whom and what helps determine organizational change in IOs is also debated on different analytical levels. The theories introduced in the first part of this chapter focus primarily on how states interact with or through IOs, or on the international system as such. They are consequently on an analytical level remote from the individual actors working in IOs. Other theories presented later in this chapter focus on the internal life of IOs themselves, and are thereby closer to my own analytical level, which focus on how a group of employees at the DPKO work to promote the Women, Peace, and Security agenda. The theories offer important contributions to this thesis, although in different ways. Firstly, because the theories examining the internal life of IOs are in some cases developed as a reaction to the more state-centric theories of IR. Second, all the theories do to some extent contribute to the debate over whom has the power to initiate and drive organizational change in IOs, and especially about how influential states are in this process.

### 3.1.1 Neorealism and Neo-liberalism

*Neorealism* and *neo-liberalism* are efforts to explain the behavior of states and how they interact. The analytical starting point of neorealism is that the interaction of states creates structures, which places restrictions on their future actions (Waltz 2008). The central characteristic of this international structure is that it is anarchic, in that it is comprised of “independent states that have no central authority above them” (Mearsheimer 2001: 30). As such, states are the only relevant actors in this system. Neo-liberalists, on the other hand, hold that not just states, but “international regimes”, such as IOs, are of analytical interest. International regimes are defined as “sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international relations” (Krasner, as quoted in Keohane 1984: 57). They are important “not because they constitute centralized quasi-governments” (Keohane 1984: 244), but because they facilitate international cooperation. States initiate international regimes and cooperation if it is in their self-interest. However, cooperation is not synonymous with shared interests; it usually requires states to “adjust policies to meet the demands of others” (Keohane 1984: 12).

Both these perspectives agree, however, that IOs do not have autonomy from, or power over, states. “Institutions that facilitate cooperation do not mandate what governments must do; rather, they pursue their own interests through cooperation” (Keohane 1984: 246). IOs are constructed, maintained and changed to benefit powerful states and consequently do not act independently. States use IOs to further their agendas and it is in their interest that IOs function to that end (Keohane 1984, Waltz 1979, 2008). Changing IOs’ priorities, structures or practice without the consent and cooperation of states would thereby imply forcing states to act contrary to their own interests. Even if IOs had some degree of autonomy, this would be impossible, as IOs have little or no power independent from states (Mearsheimer 2001). States are

consequently the only actors who can initiate and accomplish organizational change in IOs (Waltz 1979, Mearsheimer 2001). Other neo-liberal scholars contest this point<sup>7</sup>.

This conclusion is partly a result of how these perspectives understand power. According to Waltz (1979: 192) “an agent is powerful to the extent that he affects others more than they affect him”. The outcome of attempts to change your opponent’s behavior depends on the distribution of “capabilities” between you, but also on the strategic skill by which you make use of these capabilities, as well as the specific context at hand (2001: 191). Some neorealists, such as Mearsheimer (2001), place a lot of emphasis on military strength and maintains that the hierarchy of states in the international system can largely be distributed along these lines. Other neorealists, including Waltz (1979, 2008), agree with neo-liberalists that also economic, technological and political capabilities are important instruments of power (Kjær 2004).

Neorealists and most neo-liberalists rule out the possibility that IOs themselves may initiate or achieve organizational change on their own. For my analytical purposes, these perspectives’ emphasis on states’ influence serves as an important contrast to the analysis offered by the critics of the Women, Peace, and Security implementation at the UN presented in the chapter above, who focus mostly on internal features of the UN itself. The theories described in this section would argue that the reason for the UN’s lack of progress is that implementation is not in accordance with the interests of the powerful states controlling the UN. What is lacking from these theoretical perspectives is an inquiry into how states’ interests are formed. Moreover, it is assumed that IOs and their staff automatically act in accordance with state instructions. This is not taken for granted by the *constructivist* perspective.

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<sup>7</sup> Rosenau is one example of a neo-realist scholar who argues that states are not the only actors with authority in the international system. He holds that there are a variety of IOs, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and other international networks capable of influencing global norms and practices by placing them on the international agenda (Kjær 2004).



### **3.1.2 Constructivism**

Constructivist perspectives on how states and IOs interact, also examine how states' and other interests are constructed. Their epistemological foundation and understanding of power separates this perspective further for the theories introduced above. While constructivism, like the other theoretical perspectives presented in this chapter, is not a homogeneous set of ideas, constructivists share the epistemological position that our cultural background, historical context and social relationships determine how we understand the world. These "intersubjective processes" (Joachim 2003: 249) shape our worldview and are the basis of our interests and actions. States' and other actors' interests and actions may consequently be influenced by others and change depending on context. As a consequence, constructivists answer my question of who determines change in IOs quite differently from the previous perspectives.

Barnett and Finnemore's (2004) have made one of the central contributions to constructivist analysis of IOs' relationship to states. They argue that while states greatly influence IOs' behavior, internal features of IOs themselves are also decisive. IOs not only have a large degree of autonomy, they also have the power to influence states. There are two main reasons for their opposing conclusions. Firstly, they have moved the analytical focus. The theoretical perspectives presented above are mostly concerned with the international system as such or why states create IOs, and take for granted that IOs will continue to function as they were designed (Barnett & Finnemore 2004). Barnett and Finnemore instead "put [...] the interactive relationship between states and IOs at the center of analysis" (Barnett & Finnemore 2004: 12.). In so doing, they necessarily understand IOs as social actors and understanding their internal features and staff becomes significant to the analysis of this relationship.

Secondly, the constructivist understanding of power is markedly different from that held by the opposing perspectives. Rather than being something that a state or an actor has over others, this perspective understands power as a complex social relationship, where individual outcomes are dependent on the context at hand. Barnett and Finnemore (2004: 29) define power as "production, in and through social relations, of effects that shape the capacities of actors to determine their own circumstances and

fate”, which is translated throughout their book into “the capacity to get others to defer” (Barnett & Finnemore 2004). Because power is understood as socially constructed, this perspective opens up for new potential sources of power, which cannot be expected to be effective in every situation and relationship. The sociologist Max Weber termed power that is perceived as legitimate by those who are governed as “authority”. Barnett and Finnemore combine this idea of legitimacy with constructivist ideas when they define authority as “the ability of one actor to use institutional and discursive resources to induce deference from others” (Barnett & Finnemore 2004: 5). This often implies “telling people what is the right thing to do” (Barnett & Finnemore 2004: 20), either directly or by changing states’ preferences by shaping the boundaries for what states and the world around them sees as legitimate action. Because power is understood as a relationship where both sides have agency, “compliance is not automatic” (Barnett & Finnemore 2004: 20). States and others may refuse if deference is against their expressed interests or if other sources of authority give contradicting judgments. Authority is consequently not “fixed, singular, or always obeyed” (Barnett & Finnemore 2004: 20). I will return to how IOs employ their institutional and discursive sources of power in the next section of this chapter, but I will first elaborate on why IOs might be seen as legitimately telling other actors, including states, how they should act or understand certain issues.

According to Barnett & Finnemore (2004), IOs have authority because they are designed as bureaucracies. Building on the work of Weber, they argue that bureaucracies are vested with four interlinked forms of authority. The first is *rational-legal authority*. Bureaucracies are considered a rational and effective way of solving important societal tasks. Their actions and decisions are also legitimized through the impersonal rules and procedures through which they are made. The neutral application of rules ensures that bureaucracies are committed to solving their given tasks. Barnett & Finnemore (2004) stress that neutrality is clearly impossible, but the perception of it provides bureaucracies’ instructions and actions with legitimacy and thereby authority. Being responsible for resolving important societal problems and defending “the values of the international community” (Barnett & Finnemore 2004: 23) provides IOs with

*moral authority*, as long as they are considered to be dedicated to the common good, compared to the “narrow self-interest” guiding the actions of states and other stakeholders. This depoliticizes the work of IOs, something that is reinforced by their third source of authority. Because IOs are created to ensure that people with highly specialist knowledge manage important social tasks, their provisions carry *expert authority*. Their knowledge is seen as “objective” and is thereby perceived to be of higher value than the politically tainted opinions of other stakeholders. Fourthly and importantly, is the *delegated authority* from states. As IOs are often charged with tasks states for some reason are unable to carry out or have limited knowledge of, they are often mandated considerable autonomy as long as they appear to serve states’ interests.

Barnett and Finnemore (2004) stress that IOs do not only use their authority to get other actors to defer. IOs often work together with states and other international actors such as NGOs to achieve their goals, although they do not explore how and why IOs do this.

Another important point for Barnett & Finnemore (2004) is that IOs’ bureaucratic nature has implications not only for their relationship with the outside world, but also for the inner dynamic of the organizations. Drawing on sociological-institutionalist theory, they argue that IOs as bureaucratic organizations develop strong and distinct organizational cultures that advise and sustain their behavior. While the organization’s environment influences this culture, it is also a result of its rules and procedures, as well as the specific division of labor organizing its work. Organizational culture “shapes bureaucrats’ view of the world, define their social tasks, shape their interests, and orient them in similar ways toward the world” (Barnett & Finnemore 2004: 19). It guides what its bureaucrats deem to be appropriate action, “but does not determine it” (Barnett & Finnemore 2004: 19). While organizational culture influence bureaucrats’ actions, it is also shaped by these very actions (Barnett & Finnemore 2004). By stressing this, the authors probably wish to distance themselves from the constructivist scholars focusing more exclusively on how culture socializes actors, often neglecting their agency. However, Barnett and Finnemore’s (2004) case studies, including an analysis of the UN’s failure to intervene in the Rwandan genocide, hardly reflect this.

Here, organizational culture seems to be almost dictating the staff's actions, leading to disastrous results. That Barnett and Finnemore (2004) deprive IO bureaucrats of their agency is also a main strand of criticism against their analysis (Seabrook & Tsingou 2009).

Barnett and Finnemore (2004) maintain that internal features of an IO and the agency of its staff are important when analyzing organizational change in IOs. As elaborated on above, Barnett & Finnemore (2004) conflate the agency and interests of IOs and its staff, and it is often unclear whom they consider the actual social agents. Usually, IOs are presented as unitary actors who have interests and power vis-à-vis states. I will return to this point later in the chapter. The most important contribution of this perspective is its counterargument to the neo-realists/neo-liberalists understanding of IOs as completely dictated by outside forces. Outside demands or constraints, either by states or from changes in the wider normative context of the IO, may be a crucial factor, but these attempts will be filtered through the existing culture, which will affect the outcome of the reform process. Change can also emerge from processes within the organization, such as internal conflicts over resources or negotiation and reinterpretation of the existing culture (Barnett & Finnemore 2004). In the following section, I will elaborate on how IO staff act in order to achieve their agendas, such as organizational change. Here also the constructivist perspective has made important contributions.

### **3.2 What strategies may IOs employ to achieve organizational change?**

The constructivist perspective on IOs opens up for the possibility that organizations themselves can initiate and determine organizational change. Since member states are such powerful stakeholder in IOs, this would imply that IOs have influence in their relationship vis-à-vis states. Barnett & Finnemore (2004) stress that this does not mean that IOs are able to force powerful states to behave in accordance with IOs' instructions. Rather, the power of IOs is determined by their ability to help create social reality and thereby direct the interests and actions of states and other

stakeholders. In this section I elaborate on how IOs try to influence states and other stakeholders to achieve organizational change or other agendas.

### **3.2.1 Framing**

According to the constructivist perspective, IOs influence how other actors perceive the world by defining meaning and classifying the world around us. The way we ascribe meaning to events and the world around us is not objective or fixed. Rather, they are “made meaningful by actors, and actors compete to affix meaning to these events because doing so creates boundaries for acceptable action” (Barnett & Finnemore 2004: 33). This effort to make others share your understanding of an event or problem is referred to as framing, and shared frames may form the basis of common norms and social mobilization (Barnett & Finnemore 2004). Accordingly, if an IO wants to change their organizational structure and priorities in order to accommodate a new issue or problem, framing can be employed in an effort to ensure that member states and other important stakeholders share the IOs perception of this new issue or problem. It would also have to promote the IO as the best possible custodian or solution, as well a blueprint of how the IO must change to accommodate this new demand. While it depends on the context, states and other stakeholders often defer to the frames promoted by IOs because of IOs’ rational-legal, moral, expert or delegated authority.

An example of successful framing is how the area of human rights has grown to its current prominence. “IOs have helped determine not only who is in violation of human rights but also what human rights are and what should be done to promote or protect them” (Barnett & Finnemore 2004: 7). Human rights are also an example of how IOs influence how states behave. The articulation and diffusion of norms through framing creates boundaries for what is perceived as legitimate behavior, so while not all states uphold the human rights of its citizens, they are widely accepted international norms and violators can expect condemnation and sometimes even punitive measures from both national and international NGOs, IOs and other states. Achieving a similar status

is the goal of the advocates of the Women, Peace, and Security agenda inside and outside the UN.

Elsewhere, Finnemore and Sikkink elaborate on how actors use framing to help establish norms, defined as “a standard of appropriate behavior for actors with a given identity” (Finnemore & Sikkink 1998: 891), and work strategically to make these norms influential internationally. They describe a three-step process of how norms are made influential. In the first stage, norms emerge, often through the efforts of devoted activists, or “norm entrepreneurs”, to convert other actors nationally and internationally, and especially influential “norm leaders” to take on their cause. These “norm leaders” can for instance be countries with particularly high moral standing or countries that are influential in the field they are trying to influence. In order to reach a wider audience advocates need an organizational platform from which to promote their cause. This organizational platform can take the form of an issue oriented NGO or an IO with a multitude of tasks.

The second stage of this process happens *if* a sufficient number of states have adopted a norm. It then reaches a “tipping point”, after which the norm “cascades”, making it generally recognized among states and other stakeholders. Endorsement is at this point often an effort to conform to pressure from other states, as much as a result of the advocacy of “norm entrepreneurs” and domestic audiences. Empirical studies suggest at least one-third of the total number of states must adopt a norm for a tipping point to occur. However, this varies as it also depends on factors such as the inherent characteristics of the norm itself, such as its clarity and distinctness, how influential early supporters are, and the historical and cultural context in which the norm emerges. These factors also influence whether or not a tipping point is reached. Finnemore and Sikkink (1998: 901) also acknowledge that the question of why a tipping point occurs remains unexplored. However, if a norm cascades it might enter a the third stage of this process, when “norm internalization occurs [and] norms acquire a taken-for-granted quality...” (Finnemore & Sikkink 1998: 895).

Understanding why framing attempts succeed or fail is also one of the central points of Joachim's (2003) work. Unlike Barnett and Finnemore (2004) and Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) she also elaborates on how framing attempts can be both aided and thwarted by other states, organizations or individuals.

### **3.2.2 Creating Alliances**

Joachim (2003) describes how NGOs use framing to influence the UN and its member states, illustrated by how international women's organizations managed to place domestic violence and reproductive rights on the UN agenda during the early 1990s<sup>8</sup>. Both were issues characterized by "little preexisting consensus among states as to what constitutes violence and whether or how much control a woman should have over her reproduction" (Joachim 2003: 248). Moreover, many member states regarded them to be national matters in which the UN should not interfere.

Joachim (2003) explains the eventual success of the NGO community by using the framing concept introduced above, which she argues provides a bridge between the rational, strategic actors portrayed by neorealists/neo-liberalists and the constructivists' attention to how interests are constructed and changed through social processes. Like Finnemore and Sikkink (1998), Joachim shows how NGOs use framing strategically in order to shape how international policy issues are perceived and acted upon by other actors. Framing thereby "provides external resources for relatively weak actors to pursue normative change at the international level" (Joachim 2003: 251). She moreover emphasizes how context, such as other actors and events, imposes obstacles and provides opportunities for framing attempts, which she refers to as a *political opportunity structure* (Joachim 2003). Barnett and Finnemore (2004) argue that other actors often defer to IOs framing of issues because they have authority. Joachim (2003), on the other hand, holds that frames are seldom constructed

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<sup>8</sup> As I outlined in the background chapter of this thesis, these achievements formed the foundation for similar efforts for the Women, Peace and Security agenda later on.

or changed through the efforts of a single actor or institution. Rather, NGOs often cooperate with influential allies, such as IOs, states or the media. The political opportunity structure provides NGOs with potential allies and opportunities for framing, including world events, access to other influential actors, changes in political alignments and conflicts. World events may induce influential actors to see problems differently or search for alternative solutions, creating space for NGOs advocating their agenda. Changes in political alignments may bring new actors into power that are more or less benevolent towards the NGOs' agenda. Conflicts between influential actors on relevant subjects may give NGOs a chance to act as mediator and at the same time advocate their own frames. However, changes in the political opportunity structure might also be for the worse and without access to these potential partners, framing opportunities and alliances are lost. Alliances and opportunities are in themselves not sufficient to frame issues. The skills and capacities of the organizations are equally important for successful outcomes.

Two of Joachim's (2003) points are directly relevant for my own analysis. She demonstrates how framing efforts can be both restrained and assisted by other actors and circumstances. The analysis also establishes how NGOs, and not just states, can pressure the UN to adopt new priorities. For IOs such as the UN, this may become a problem. They often face conflicting demands, or demands that collide with the actions determined appropriate by internal organizational culture. The result is often a startling discrepancy between IOs' rhetoric and action.

### **3.3 Discrepancies Between Rhetoric and Practice in IOs**

As stated earlier, the purpose of this chapter is to identify how different theoretical perspectives analyzing organizational change and discrepancies between rhetoric and practice in IOs can help us understand the UN's slow implementation of the Women, Peace, and Security Resolutions, despite its vocal support of the agenda. Before considering how the theories outlined in this chapter are relevant for the Women, Peace, and Security implementation process at the DPKO, I will introduce possible



explanations to why there is a discrepancy between an IO's rhetorical goals and commitments and what it actually does in practice.

### 3.3.1 “Organized Hypocrisy”

This discrepancy, theoretically referred to as *organized hypocrisy*, is the focus of the work of both Michael Lipson (2007a) and Catherine Weaver (2008). Like Joachim (2003) these scholars try to incorporate ideas from both sides of the debate between constructivism and neo-realism/neo-liberalism, while also drawing on sociological theory.

The term *organized hypocrisy* was originally a contribution to organizational sociology by Nils Brunsson, which Weaver (2008) and Lipson (2007a) relocated from the domestic to the international arena. According to Brunsson (2002), organizations depend on the outside world for material resources, such as funding and its work force. The environment also provides organizations with legitimacy, contingent on how they manage to reflect the environment's culture, norms or other demands, or how effectively they carry out their given tasks. The organization's environment is not unitary; there are often a variety of outside actors and agendas creating “conflicting material and normative pressures” (Lipson 2007a: 6) for the organization. Hypocrisy, defined as “inconsistent rhetoric and action” (Lipson 2007a: 8), makes it possible for an organization to maintain its legitimacy in this difficult situation. Brunsson distinguishes between two types, *the organization of hypocrisy* and *organized hypocrisy*, neither being necessarily the conscious strategy of an organization's staff. *The organization of hypocrisy* refers to how these constraints and demands are “incorporated into organizations' internal structures” (Lipson 2007a: 9). *Organized hypocrisy* refers to inconsistencies in organizational output, separated into talk, decisions or actions. In other words, when rhetoric or decisions do not lead to corresponding action. Rather, talk and decisions are substitutes for action, so that the organization can be seen as placating conflicting normative and material demands at

the same time. This is exactly what the UN has been criticized for doing with regards the Women, Peace, and Security Resolutions.

Brunsson (2002) continues by distinguishing between two organizational ideal types that solve this problem in very different ways. An “action-oriented” organization is a coherent, independent unit focused on solving an important problem or changing its environment (ibid: 194). They are considered as legitimate by the outside world if they effectively solve their task. The NGOs analyzed by Joachim (2003), trying to push women’s issues on to the UN’s agenda, are examples of organizations close to this ideal type. A “political” organization, on the other hand, is “organizational actors with porous boundaries, interpenetrated and constituted by their institutional environments” (Lipson 2007a: 10-11). They often have much wider mandates and are charged with important, but often insoluble problems. Their legitimacy does not stem from effective action, but from their ability to mirror the inconsistent culture and norms of the environment. “Action oriented” and “political” organizations are ideal types; real life organizations can be found anywhere in between and most often face demands for action *and* that they reflect outside norms to a varying degree (Brunsson 2002).

Both types of organizations employ both types of hypocrisy. Hypocrisy is reflected in the internal structures of “action oriented organizations” when outside norms and demands are incompatible with “efficiently generating coordinated action” (Brunsson 2002: 7). This is solved by having two organizational structures exist side by side: one formal structure fashioned to generate talk and decisions in accordance to the demands and norms of the outside world, and an informal structure “used in reality” (Brunsson 2002: 7) which is responsible for action. For “political” organizations, wide mandates may lead to complex organizational structures with a variety of divisions and sub-divisions, each serving different masters and promoting its own agenda (Brunsson 2002, Weaver 2008).

### **3.3.2 The UN as a “Political Organization”**

Organized hypocrisy, or when an organization’s talk and decisions are inconsistent with or contrary to action, is the focus of Lipson’s (2007a) work, and he uses Brunsson’s term in an effort to explain why many UN peacekeeping operations fail to accomplish their mandates. He first identifies the UN as an international “political” organization, an “open system”, “constituted and penetrated by the member states” (2007a: 12). Its legitimacy is not only dependent on its ability to reflect its members’ various preferences and commonly held norms, it is also expected to actually accomplish extremely difficult tasks such as peacekeeping. In other words, it face both “political” and “action-oriented” expectation and demands. The problem is that material constraints or normative pressure from the member states often contradicts the goals that the UN is meant to achieve. One example is when norms widely held by the member states, such as sovereignty, conflicts with tasks the organization is charged with, such as the protection of civilians. Another is when the UN is pressured to send peacekeeping forces in the face of a political or humanitarian crisis, without being supplied the resources, funding or political will necessary to effectively accomplish the task. The result is that the UN addresses many of these issues solely through “discussion, debate, and by issuing declarations, Resolutions and other forms of organizational talk and decisions” (Lipson 2007a: 13). Like Brunsson (2002), Lipson (2007a) does not necessarily consider organized hypocrisy to be normatively wrong. While it might cause mission failure or undermine efforts to solve important global issues, organized hypocrisy may also be a strategy to manage an otherwise impossible situation and create space for effective action.

Concerning whether state interests or internal features of IOs themselves determine IO behavior and organizational change and whether IOs can influence state behavior, Lipson elsewhere argues that both organizational culture and member state pressure determines how the UN acts (Lipson 2007b). The theoretical outline of his article on hypocrisy in the UN (Lipson 2007a) stresses that IOs are “not unitary actors but rather, collectives constituted and endowed with social agency by their social environment” (Lipson 2007a: 9). While stressing the lack of boundaries between the UN and its

member states, Lipson (2007a) focus mainly on organized hypocrisy and not on how the internal structure of the organization incorporates the conflicting pressure in his analysis of UN peacekeeping. The result is that the differences between various parts of the UN when it comes to agendas and relationships with member states and other important actors remain unexplored. When applying the theory in his analysis of UN peacekeeping, he treats the UN as a unitary actor with a single agenda, which is maintaining its legitimacy in the eyes of its surroundings by placating the goals and demands formulated by the member states and other stakeholders, leaving little room for the interests and agency of UN staff.

### **3.3.3 IO Staff as the Social Agents**

This is not the case with Weaver's (2008) analysis of hypocrisy in the World Bank, where she portrays IOs as a myriad of "independent and uncoordinated individuals or departments each being an actor on its own..." (Brunsson as quoted in Weaver 2008: 34). Outside demands may have shaped the formal structure of the organization, but these demands do not decide the behavior of the organization's staff. They have agency and interests in their own right and organizational culture is only one of the factors shaping their interests. Weaver thereby changes the analytical focus closer to the individual employees of the organization, and it is they, not the organization itself, who are considered social agents.

Like Lipson (2007a), Weaver's (2004) primary focus is on organized hypocrisy. In addition to Brunsson (2002), her analysis also incorporates other scholars from organizational sociology, who focus on organizations' internal culture, as well as Barnett and Finnemore (2004). Based on her extensive fieldwork in the World Bank, she demonstrates how pressure for reform from within and without the Bank led to discrepancies between the organization's talk, decisions and action. The World Bank initially disregarded increasingly fashionable concepts in the development sector, such as good governance and anti-corruption, even though these concepts were understood as "morally indisputable" (Weaver 2008: 92) by many of the powerful member states

and other stakeholders. The disregard was a result of the new ideas' difficulty in fitting in with the organization's "economistic and technocratic culture" (Weaver 2008: 39), but also because of the heavy-handedness of some of the reformers. The result was organized hypocrisy. The lesson Weaver draws from this is that organizational change depends "not only on navigating the dangerous political waters around the Bank, but also the cultural waters of its bureaucracy" (Weaver 2008: 139). However, she stresses that organizational culture is not static or all encompassing for the staff's behavior. Organization's ideologies, norms, language and routines are constantly being negotiated, contested and revised, either by outside pressure, such as from member states, civil society or other stakeholders, or by organization staff themselves bringing their personal experiences and knowledge with them in their work. Organizational culture is therefore a central arena for organizational change. By employing a constructivist understanding of power the staff are not only agents, they may potentially influence both the organization's and its member states' behavior.

With regards to the theoretical perspectives introduced above she warns about perceiving either internal or external culture and demands as static or unitary. She also stresses the danger of portraying the actions of IO staff as determined by either states' demands or organization culture. Rather, she finds ample evidence of strategic agency among staff pursuing their different agendas.

### **3.4 Relevance for the Implementation Process at the DPKO**

As stated in the introduction, this thesis' primary research questions are: What strategies did the team responsible for coordinating the implementation of the Women, Peace and Security Resolutions at the DPKO employ in their effort to implement this agenda in the work of military peacekeepers? And what contextual issues and actors did they see as constraining or aiding them in their effort?

The aim of these questions is to understand the DPKO's lack of progress in implementing the Women, Peace, and Security Resolutions, despite the UN's rhetorical commitment to this agenda. The critical literature introduced in the former

chapter argues that this is a consequence of a lack of normative consensus, prejudice when it comes to gender issues and organizational inertia in the UN itself. The primary purpose of this chapter was to examine whether theoretical perspectives on organizational change and differences between rhetoric and practice in IOs could contribute to an alternative explanation. As indicated above, these theoretical perspectives offer diverging explanations to this inconsistency. They would all agree, however, that the UN member states play an important part.

The theoretical perspectives introduced in this chapter suggest a more complicated picture than that presented by the critics. The neo-realist and neo-liberalist perspectives suggest that the process of implementing the Women, Peace, and Security agenda in the UN cannot be analyzed without considering how the UN member states influence this process. However, these perspectives do not offer any suggestions as to how the relationship between the UN and member states play out for the staff working in the DPKO or the rest of the UN organization. Lipson's (2007a) analysis of the UN offers some answers. He holds that the member states are integrated into the UN's formal structure and that being perceived by the member states as embodying their values and conforming to their demands is the source of the UN's funding and legitimacy. As I described in my outline of the organizational structure of the DPKO, the member states are formally in charge of both the Department's budgets and priorities. Following Lipson (2007a), the discrepancies between the DPKO's rhetoric and actions, which the critical literature of the organization's implementation process sets out to expose, are a consequence of incompatible demands from the member states. Placating the demands for gender mainstreaming through rhetorical commitment to the Resolutions without actual implementation would solve this problem. While Lipson holds that the UN also has an organizational culture, it is unclear what this implies. It also remains unclear whether the UN has any influence in its relationship with the member states, or if it is only aiming to accommodate the different values and demands of the member states as best it can.

Barnett and Finnemore's (2004) work suggest that the UN has authority, which makes it capable of influencing how member states perceive and thereby acts when it comes

to implementing the Women, Peace, and Security Resolutions. They also argue that implementation of the Resolutions in the organization itself should be carried out by the organization itself and not just as a result of outside demands. I find Barnett and Finnemore's (2004) constructivist understanding of power useful for my analytical purpose because it understands power as a relationship where all sides have agency. It also accommodates the notion that how this relationship plays out is dependent on context. Their understanding does not mean that material resources are not important sources of power. However, the institutional and discursive power of the UN and other actors help determine when, where and how other sources of power are used and perceived as legitimate.

Suggestions of how this power may be exercised can also be found in Barnett and Finnemore's (2004) discussion of authority and framing. Their understanding of framing is of particular interest to my analysis of how members of the DPKO work to mainstream the Women, Peace, and Security agenda in their own organization and among military peacekeepers.

Barnett and Finnemore (2004) characterize the relationship between the UN and its member states as cooperation and competition for influence over central issues without exploring how and when competition and cooperation takes place. These questions are, on the other hand, addressed by Joachim (2003). Accordingly, the DPKO team's framing efforts of the Women, Peace, and Security agenda can be both aided and restricted by other actors, such as international or national NGOs or member states. Moreover, both member states and NGOs are often employing the same tactics and might thereby influence the UN's political agenda and actions. She stresses, however, that successful framing and alliance building may depend on structural factors and events outside the UN's control. Joachim's (2003) work also suggests that other actors, such as NGOs, may pressure and influence the UN political agenda and actions when it comes to the Women, Peace, and Security agenda.

Weaver's (2008) work on organized hypocrisy highlights additional problems with both Lipson's (2007a) and Barnett and Finnemore's (2004) analyses with regards to

my research question. They portray the UN as a unitary structure, where the behavior of UN staff is largely determined either by the demands of the member states or by organizational culture. In these theories there is little room for the agency of the organization's staff, which is the central focus of this thesis. Weaver (2008) demonstrates that IOs, such as the UN, are neither unitary nor static. Accordingly, the agenda of the DPKO and its staff is influenced by the UN's common culture, but also by the units' specific relationship with the world around the Department, including the larger UN organization, the member states, NGOs and other actors. Weaver's (2008) work also explains how the relationship between the staff, the DPKO's organizational culture and its environment is interactive, giving the staff not only agency, but also potential power. Organizational culture and the relationship with outside actors consequently provide both instruments of power and constraints for individuals or groups of staff. How much the actions of the DPKO staff is constrained is however uncertain. As a theoretical research question guiding my thesis I therefore ask: In which ways are the actions of DPKO staff influenced by the interests of member states and to what extent are they independent social actors?

In sum, the different theoretical perspectives provide supplementary insights, which helped me in both collecting and analyzing the empirical data that informs the conclusions of this thesis. Lipson (2007a) and Weaver (2008) provide elaborate descriptions of the complex institutional structure the DPKO team works in and how this formal and cultural structure provides boundaries for their actions. This structure is not static and can consequently be changed. Barnett and Finnemore (2004), Joachim (2003) and Weaver (2008) suggest tools IO staff may employ in their efforts to bring about change by influencing the rest of the organization and member states. The theoretical perspectives' differing views on the agency and authority of UN staff have also provided me with a theoretical research question, which I will answer after presenting my research design and empirical findings.



## **4. Research Design**

In order to understand what strategies the team responsible for coordinating the implementation of the Women, Peace and Security Resolutions at the DPKO employed in their effort to implement this agenda in the work of military peacekeepers and how contextual issues and other actors constrained or aided their efforts, I relied on a combination of interviews and text analysis, which I elaborate on below. But first I will outline the epistemological foundation for this thesis and how to ensure the quality of research.

### **4.1 Scientific Rigor and Epistemology**

The epistemological perspective presented by Wetherell, Taylor & Yates (2001) and Kvale (2001) forms the basis of this thesis. These scholars propose a view of truth as something situated, conditional and reflexive. Establishing scientific rigor is consequently dependent on the researcher's ability to argue convincingly that the findings presented are more accurate than competing interpretations and is a question of communicating methodological proficiency to a critical reader. Central to achieving this is presenting supported arguments for your interpretation and being critical toward your own conclusions. Scholarly work must be relevant for your scientific field and the world at large, as well as transparent with regards to your methodological and analytical choices. This includes openness around inconsistencies and diversity in your data. Consistent data from multiple types of sources and methodologies will further increase the persuasive power of your conclusions. I will return to these common recommendations implicitly or explicitly throughout the relevant chapters of this thesis.

The aim of this thesis is to understand my interviewees' particular perspective on a specific process and not aiming at discovering some external objective truth. I am in other words interpreting my informants' perception of the process (Fangen 2010). This means that the interviewees' specific background and perspectives shape their

answers. My interpretations and analysis of these answers are furthermore based on my own frame of reference. To counter explicit misunderstandings I made an effort to check my interpretations by asking the informants directly if I had understood them correctly, either during the interview or through quote check, conversations or correspondence later in the process. However, for practical reasons this was not possible with some of the interviewees, mostly due to their busy schedules. My own background doubtlessly also influenced the answers I got. While I know a lot about the more general efforts and controversies of the implementation of the Women, Peace and Security Resolutions, I knew less than my expert informants of the particulars of the work done at the DPKO and their relationship with other important stakeholders. A more knowledgeable and experienced researcher might have been able to excavate more substantial findings. Moreover, someone less favorable to the goals of the Women, Peace and Security Resolutions might have prodded more critically during the interviews, which no doubt would have affected the findings. However, my relative inexperience often led the informants to explain their views very thoroughly, which often provided me with very clear formulations. By being perceived as benevolent to the Women, Peace, and Security agenda and not belonging to a particular organization with vested interests, the informants may also have expressed themselves more freely as they did not have to protect their agenda or fellow implementers in the UN or member states from criticism.

## **4.2 Choice of Methodology and Sample**

I relied on three sources of data. My primary source was interviews with current and former staff employed at the DPKO to work with issues relating to the Women, Peace, and Security agenda. My second source was interviews with Norwegian diplomats, bureaucrats and scholars. Thirdly, I conducted textual analysis of the DPKO/DFS Gender Guidelines, which operationalizes the Women, Peace, and Security Resolutions for UN military personnel. Below, I will go into more detail about the two types of interviews, before elaborating on the text analysis.

The primary goal of this thesis is to understand the process of implementing the Women, Peace, and Security Resolutions at the DPKO from the perspective of those working to implement them. This could only be understood through interviews with the people in question (Rubin & Rubin 2005). I therefore chose qualitative interviews with personnel from the DPKO Gender Unit and the Office of Military Affairs involved in the process. I conducted seven interviews in total with former and current DPKO staff, which constitute my primary source of data for the analysis. As I will return to later in this chapter, the number of interviewees from the DPKO was decided by the limited number of people working with these subjects at the DPKO.

As a secondary source of data, I conducted interviews with eight Norwegian scholars, bureaucrats and diplomats. The number of interviewees in this group was decided more randomly; I stopped seeking out additional informants when the interviews no longer generated new insights. The interviewees were chosen because they are experts either on the work of DPKO or on the implementation of the Women, Peace and Security Resolutions at the UN. The choice of Norwegians was both a matter of where I had most contacts and consequently access to interviewees, and due to Norway's central position as a donor and its high level of political commitment to the Women, Peace and Security efforts at the UN<sup>9</sup>,

The secondary interviews were conducted in two rounds. The first provided background information about the DPKO and other central stakeholders in the implementation process, which I made use of in preparing for my primary interviews with the DPKO personnel. The second round came after I returned from New York. In these interviews, I made use of the Norwegian informants' expertise to discuss and validate the interpretations and conclusions I developed from the interviews with the DPKO personnel. These informants were invaluable in helping me in my efforts to interpret the answers given by the DPKO personnel by providing insight into the specific UN lingo, as well as the political context and controversies surrounding the implementation process.

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<sup>9</sup> This was brought up by every interviewee I interviewed and referred to as common knowledge.

The interviews with DPKO personnel and the Norwegian diplomats were conducted during my research trip to New York in the last days of February and early March 2010 or over the telephone.

<b>DATA COLLECTION</b>			
<i><b>Mode</b></i>	<i><b>Source</b></i>		
Primary interviews	DPKO personnel (5)	Former DPKO personnel (2)	
Secondary interviews	Norwegian bureaucrats (3)	Norwegian diplomats (3)	Norwegian scholars (2)
Analysis of written material	DPKO/DFS Gender Guidelines (2010)		

Table 4.1: Sources of Data

#### **4.2.1 Interview Format**

The interview guide I brought with me consisted of a short list of common topics I wished to discuss during the interviews, complimented by three or four questions specifically tailored to the informant at hand. This format was used for both primary and secondary interviews. My reason for choosing such an unstructured format was twofold. Firstly, as my initial interviews were exploratory, I did not wish to forfeit interesting subjects brought up by the informants, which I often added to my list of topics for subsequent interviews. Secondly, due to my informants' busy schedules, the duration of the interviews varied greatly and I needed to find a format that could capture a similar range of subjects in very different time spans.

The list of topics discussed during the interview included the criticism against the implementation process at the UN, possible obstacles to implementation, the relationship between the DPKO and other central stakeholders and the process of creating the gender guidelines. For the full list of topics, please see Appendix II of this thesis. The topics grew out of the literature critical of the implementation process at

the UN and from the theoretical perspectives that try to explain barriers to change in international organizations, as well as from the initial background interviews. How these subjects were approached varied from informant to informant, depending on whether the interviewee was one of the DPKO personnel or saw their work from the outside.

#### **4.2.2 Gaining Access to the Informants**

Coming in contact with potential participants among Norwegian diplomats, bureaucrats and scholars was fairly easy, as there are many people with extensive knowledge of this agenda at the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Permanent Mission of Norway to the UN and the Norwegian Police. I gained access to this group of informants by referral from other informants (snowball sampling), as well as through contacts among the researchers at PRIO (International Peace Research Institute, Oslo) and NUPI (Norwegian Institute of International Affairs), some of whom also served as informants. I tried to interview people who had different perspectives and areas of expertise, such as experts on the DPKO as an organization, the Women, Peace and Security agenda or people with substantial field experience from UN peacekeeping missions.

Arranging interviews with DPKO personnel was more demanding. The Gender Unit consists of seven employees, including senior staff. In addition, three employees from the OMA were involved in the development of the gender guidelines. The number of potential interviewees drops further when taking into account busy work schedules and frequent traveling. I tried to solve this by also interviewing two former employees of the DPKO Gender Team. These participants often provided even richer data, as they could speak their mind more freely about controversial issues. I made contact with all the participants in this group through my own contacts at NUPI or with the help of my Norwegian informants.

### **4.2.3 Analyzing the Military Gender Guidelines**

The third source of information that contributed to the answer to my research questions was a textual analysis of the final draft of the DPKO/DFS Gender Guidelines. The guidelines are the first effort to operationalize UNSCR 1325, UNSCR 1820, UNSCR 1888 and UNSCR 1889 on Women, Peace and Security for military peacekeepers. The guidelines are meant to be practical tools in the planning and execution of peacekeeping missions by all military personnel, from the OMA at the UN headquarters in New York, to the operational-level at the force headquarters in the field and among deployed military personnel.

I analyzed the gender guidelines after conducting my primary interviews with DPKO employees and the first round of background interviews with Norwegian bureaucrats, diplomats and scholars. The primary objective of this analysis was to corroborate or contradict the information provided by those interviewed. However, the guidelines also provided concrete examples on subjects that had been only vaguely referred to in the interviews and clarified many of the descriptions provided by the interviewees. Moreover, they contributed a more specific outline of certain parts of the process of developing the guidelines, for instance by specifically stating all the contributing member states.

### **4.3 Limitations**

Much of the literature critical of the implementation pace of the Women, Peace and Security Resolutions refer to the UN system as a whole, and the more explicit of these, such as Raven-Roberts (2005), places the reason for the pace solely on the internal workings of UN organizations. The theoretical perspectives on organized hypocrisy introduced in chapter three dismiss that IOs such as the UN can be analyzed as a unitary actor. Rather, it is made up of groups and individuals with distinct interests and agendas. I only focus on the process of creating gender guidelines for military peacekeepers at the DPKO, in other words, one specific process within a single unit of the UN organization. My conclusions will therefore not necessarily be valid for other

parts of the UN system, as their relationship with the rest of the organization and other stakeholders may be very different. However, my analysis may provide a more complete understanding of the apparent lack of coherence between rhetoric and practice when it comes to implementing the Women, Peace, and Security Resolutions at the DPKO and in peacekeeping operations by including the UN member states' and other outside actors' potential influence on this process. It can also explore the DPKO staff's potential for initiating and advancing organizational change.

I do not aim at presenting an “objective” account of the relationship between the DPKO and other central stakeholders in this implementation process. My goal was to understand how this process is seen from the point of reference of those involved in this work at the DPKO. Personnel on the ground in peacekeeping operations, representatives from TCCs and other stakeholders might perceive the process very differently.

#### **4.4 Ethical Considerations**

While there are a number of guidelines to advise social scientists who make use of qualitative interviews as a method of data collection, Kvale (2001) stresses that these do not offer a blueprint to all the situations that might demand ethical considerations from the researcher. The researcher must therefore consider the ethical implications of a specific research project throughout the research process. This section will outline my effort to comply with the relevant ethical guidelines concerned with research on individuals offered by the National Committee for Research Ethics in the Social Sciences and the Humanities (NESH: 2009). Of these, informed consent and confidentiality proved most important to my interviewees.

Informed consent refers to the researcher's obligation to give information about the research project's goals and design, in a manner understandable to the participant. Participants should also be made aware that they may withdraw from participating at any point or choose not to answer individual questions. Confidentiality refers to

preserving the anonymity of those informants that wish to remain so and to limiting access to information that was given in confidence.

I began the interview process by supplying the informants with a letter, either via e-mail or when we met, which gave a short description of my project and outlined their rights to withdraw or withhold information and how I intended to ensure the confidentiality of the participants. The full text of the letter can be found in appendix III of this paper. However, the information retrieved during the interviews continually introduced subjects of interest, something that gradually changed the focus of the thesis. At the beginning of all the interviews I therefore also offered a more comprehensive account of my project and answered any questions the interviewees had. During these conversations and after the interview, several of my informants asserted reluctance to have parts of the information and descriptions they provided included in the published thesis, such as negative accounts of the performance of specific individuals, organizations or member countries. Several of the informants asked for these kinds of omissions on account of the challenges in ensuring the confidentiality of the participants, due to the small number of people working directly with implementing these Resolutions. Recognition of the individual participants could consequently have been a risk. This was discussed and solved with the individual interviewees.

One of the interviewees for instance decided against being tape-recorded, so that she could express her opinions more freely, even though none of the names of the interviewees were included in the transcripts and the recording and transcripts and notes will be destroyed after the thesis is completed and graded, after having been accessible only to the external examiners and myself. Two other interviewees preferred not to be quoted in the written thesis. Their answers were therefore rephrased, rather than presented as direct quotes in my analysis. All interviewees were also offered final approval of all direct quotes made use of in the paper. While I discussed my findings with three of my Norwegian informants in order to validate my conclusions, this was always in a very generalized form, so as not to reveal the identity of other interviewees.



Having to omit negative views of central stakeholders and not always being able to support my findings with direct quotes made the mode of presentation in the analysis somewhat complicated. However, this was necessary in order to ensure both consent and confidentiality. On the other hand, not taking this into consideration before conducting the interviews would most likely have influenced the kind of statements the participants would have felt at liberty to make and thereby attenuated the findings even more.

#### **4.5 Mode of Analysis**

The literature critical of the implementation process in the UN and the theoretical perspectives on organized hypocrisy and organizational change in IOs informed many of the topics included in the interview guide, as well as the analysis of the interview data. My aim was to understand how the DPKO tried to change how the military peacekeepers in UN missions operate, and who or what they perceived as assisting or constraining them in this process. This was, in other words, an effort to change attitudes and practices in one part of the organization by another part of the organization. Due to the specific nature of the relationship between the UN and its member states when it comes to the deployment of military peacekeepers, this entailed not only influencing the soldiers themselves, but also the TCCs who are responsible for pre-deployment training, including teaching the soldiers about the tenets of these Resolutions. Formally, the wishes of the member states determine the actions of the DPKO and neither the DPKO nor the other UN organizations can force the UN member states to do anything they do not want to do. However, Weaver (2008), and Barnett and Finnemore (2004), argue that in reality IO staff has the ability to initiate organizational change and influence member states.

In my analysis of the relationship between the DPKO team trying to implement the Women, Peace and Security Agenda and the rest of the DPKO and other stakeholders, I examined whether the DPKO staff had agency independent from member states and also this agency was exercised in a specific process: the development of the

DFS/DPKO Gender Guidelines for military peacekeepers. As outlined in my description of the DPKO's formal structure, this development process, as well as the guidelines' eventual implementation is dependent on the DPKO, the UN and the member states. How these actors enabled and constrained this work, and if and how the team responsible for the guidelines tried to influence them is central to my analysis

When analyzing the interviews with current and former DPKO personnel, I followed a set of analytical criteria. These included:

- 1) Descriptions of the process of developing the guidelines.
- 2) Descriptions of how the DPKO personnel tried to influence the TCCs and other important actors.
- 3) Descriptions of the limits, both formal and informal, of their influence.
- 4) How they considered their work to be influenced by the other central stakeholders.
- 5) Descriptions of the relationship between the DPKO and other stakeholders they wished to cooperate with to expedite the implementation process.

I compare these findings with a textual analysis of the final guidelines and the perspectives provided in the interviews with the Norwegian bureaucrats and diplomats, looking for statements that contradicted, corroborated or explained the findings from the primary interviews and guidelines.

In my textual analysis of the DPKO/DFS Gender Guidelines I looked specifically for:

- 1) Descriptions of the process of developing the guidelines.
- 2) Statements on why and how gender mainstreaming was presented as important.

The empirical findings commencing from this analysis will be presented in the next chapter.

## 5. Empirical Findings

The empirical findings presented in this chapter are based primarily on the interviews with current and former DPKO personnel. These findings were compared to and re-analyzed with the findings from the interviews with Norwegian diplomats, bureaucrats and scholars and the text analysis of the completed gender guidelines, as specified throughout the text and in the footnotes. What emerged from my analysis was that the DPKO personnel developing the DPKO/DFS Gender Guidelines had three main strategies to advance this effort, *persistence*, *alliance building* and *framing*, around which this chapter is organized. Their descriptions also revealed that their efforts faced obstacles and resistance from various actors, which I will describe in context of the strategies that were used to overcome them. These strategies, points of resistance and obstacles show that other actors had a lot of influence over the DPKO team's work. Towards the end of the chapter, I depict how the interviewees perceive the criticism advanced against the implementation process at the DPKO. But first I outline the formal process of developing the gender guidelines.

### 5.1 The Formal Development Process

According to the completed guidelines, the process of developing the gender guidelines was a collaboration between the OMA and the Gender Unit, building on the earlier efforts to implement the Women, Peace, and Security Resolutions at the DPKO (DPKO/DFS 2010: 5). Both units contributed personnel to a working group in charge of coordinating a dialogue and writing process. The group therefore included staff with professional backgrounds from both the civilian and military parts of peacekeeping missions. The process began with a consultation trip to UN peacekeeping missions in Syria, Darfur/Sudan, Lebanon and Haiti, to consult “with the military, personnel from other peacekeeping components, UN partner entities, local authorities and civilian population” (DPKO/DFS 2010: 3). The draft of the guidelines emanating from this trip was then distributed to all peacekeeping missions for their input (DPKO/DFS 2010: 3). The next and final step was to involve representatives from 14 TCCs, the African

Union, the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, as well as from the NGO community “to review and validate the draft guidelines” (DPKO/DFS 2010: 3).

## **5.2 The Interviewees’ Description of the Development Process**

The interviewees’ explained that in reality, developing the guidelines was a much longer and more complicated process. The process can be divided into three interconnected phases.

The first step was the effort to get permission to develop guidelines from the DPKO leadership and member states, and to build political support from those who would eventually implement the guidelines: the member states, the DPKO leadership and military personnel at the DPKO and in the field. As contributors of troops, as well as political and financial support, it was paramount that the member states supported the agenda. According to one of the interviewees from the OMA, some countries agreed to the central tenets of the Women, Peace, and Security Resolutions. Other countries considered them to be important, but had yet to make progress with the implementation<sup>10</sup>. There were, however, also TCCs, both from the global South and North, who in reality did not support this agenda at all<sup>11</sup>.

The initial part of the influencing process was consequently to convince TCCs and the other member states instructing the funding and formal priorities of the DPKO that the tenets of the Women, Peace, and Security Resolutions were important. Also a lot of the civilian and military personnel at the DPKO headquarters and in peacekeeping missions had to be convinced. Getting the military staff onboard was particularly important, as it is the formal responsibility of the missions’ military contingents to implement the guidelines at the operational and tactical level in the field. In a situation with limited funds and capacity, the field personnel must understand and prioritize the gender guidelines if they were to be actually, rather than just rhetorically,

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<sup>10</sup> According to a current member of the OMA.

<sup>11</sup> According to two of the current members of the Gender Unit and one member of the OMA. All my Norwegian interviewees implicitly or explicitly corroborated this view.

implemented. As I will describe below, the Gender Unit initially faced political resistance and other obstacles from both member states and military and civilian UN staff, and therefore had to work strategically to obtain the support and funding it needed in order to initiate the development process.

The second step was developing a set of guidelines that were practically, economically and politically feasible to implement. As outlined in the background chapter, many of the provisions in the Women, Peace, and Security Resolutions depend on the capacity and political will of the TCCs. For instance, the Resolutions instruct the DPKO to increase the number of women in high-level positions within the organization and in missions. However, it is the member states that nominate and promote personnel to these positions. As member states want to have people who will promote their interests in high-level positions, there are considerable political ramifications to the employment process<sup>12</sup>. The Resolutions also asks the TCCs to increase their number of female military peacekeepers and to train their troops in the central tenets of the Women, Peace, and Security agenda before deployment. As most TCCs currently have few women in their national armies, this would imply restructuring their national recruitment processes. The DPKO is, however, not in a position to demand anything. As stated by a current member of the Gender Unit:

...we can't tell member states what to do, we can't [...] say; you must have more women. I mean, that's not going to happen. Politically you can't do that. You can suggest more women would be useful...

Even though a current member of OMA stressed that the DPKO have already had some success in increasing the number of women military personnel, this increase has not been as great as the OMA hoped and expected. The current and former DPKO staff highlighted Rwanda, South Africa and Sweden as countries that were good at gender training and deploying female peacekeepers. However, the challenge is not only to increase the number of women.

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<sup>12</sup> According to a former member of the Gender Unit and all but two of the Norwegian diplomats, bureaucrats and scholars.

...it's how they are being deployed as well... Not just that they are sending women, but that they are sending women to do the job they are trained for.<sup>13</sup>

Some countries deploy fully trained female soldiers but use them only as cooks or medics. However, if the gender guidelines are to be effectively implemented, the gender guidelines had to be seen as being legitimate and actively prioritized not only by the TCCs, but also by donor countries, the DPKO leadership and high-level military personnel. Developing the guidelines was therefore partly an effort to maintain political and financial support, for instance through rounds of consultation and verification by the other stakeholders.

The third stage is the formal and practical implementation. As this stage of the process has just begun, only the two first parts of the process is the focus of this thesis. However, anticipated obstacles and resistance in the third step influenced the staff's work with the other two.

The descriptions from the guidelines and by the interviewees show that even though the Best Practices' Gender Team was formally responsible for developing gender guidelines for military peacekeepers, the process was permeated by other central stakeholders, most significantly representatives from peacekeeping missions, military personnel at the DPKO and member states. As I will elaborate on below, the involvement of these actors represented both boundaries and resources for the DPKO team's efforts to develop the guidelines.

### **5.3 Strategies and Obstacles**

All the informants interviewed for this thesis placed emphasis on the role played by the member states. The interviewees working, or formerly working, at the DPKO stressed that the member states "own" the UN, as well as the Women, Peace, and Security Resolutions. Without their consent, the Resolutions, including the military gender guidelines, cannot be implemented. In addition, the DPKO leadership and the high level military personnel both at the headquarters and in peacekeeping missions

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<sup>13</sup> Current member of the DPKO Gender Team.

could formally and informally restrict the DPKO Gender Team's influence over the finished guidelines and their implementation. While some representatives among these stakeholders were supporters of the Women, Peace, and Security agenda, others objected. Four obstacles or causes of resistance could be distinguished throughout the development process: "the protection of civilians" agenda, resistance against women's empowerment, lack of coordination and conceptual confusion<sup>14</sup>.

However, the informants' descriptions revealed that the interests and actions of the DPKO personnel responsible for the gender guidelines were influenced, but not determined, by these restrictions. As described below, the members of the team used a number of methods to influence the rest of the organization and the member states, which demonstrated various forms of agency. Drawing on the strategies introduced by Barnett and Finnemore (2004), Joachim (2003) and Weaver (2008), the informants' descriptions fall into three principal influencing strategies: *persistence*, *alliance building* and *framing*, which the DPKO team employed against the restrictions and obstacles. *Persistence* denotes being patient and not ceding in the face of political resistance and practical obstacles, but rather waiting for circumstances to change. *Alliance building* implies creating and maintaining alliances with other supporters of the Women, Peace, and Security agenda to convince audiences over whom the Gender Team had little influence. As explained by Barnett and Finnemore (2004), *framing* means trying to influence how other actors perceive a problem, event or phenomenon. How these three strategies were employed, the types of resistance the strategies were met with and which stakeholders the strategies were aimed at, all changed during the stages of the development. I describe this in detail below.

## 5.4 Persistence

The Gender Unit had to be *persistent* in their advocacy to gain permission to develop the military gender guidelines. All the interviewees formerly or currently working at the UN stressed that this was a slow, step-by-step process. As stated by a current

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<sup>14</sup> These were either explicitly or implicitly referred to by all the informants interviewed for this thesis.

member of the Gender Team: “I mean, the UN is snail-like, [everything] takes forever...”

This was not only because of a lack of political support, but also because gender mainstreaming had not been particularly advanced at the DPKO before the initial Women, Peace, and Security Resolution, UNSCR 1325, was adopted. The implementation process was in other words a formidable task.

[UNSCR] 1325 [...] was a watershed... It was the first time women had been afforded this status within conflict [...] the idea that women are impacted differently by conflict than men. They had never thought about this. Prior to 1325 gender had never been institutionalized within peacekeeping, only in ad hoc things...

According to the informants at the DPKO Gender Unit the process of developing gender guidelines was initiated as early as 2005 by the DPKO gender advisor that worked on Women, Peace, and Security related issues before the Gender Team was established, but at that time she was unable to move forward with the process.

[The development process] has been going on for quite a while... Since 2005... when [name of gender advisor], who at the time was the gender adviser for the unit took it to the military [but] it wasn't a good time at that point<sup>15</sup>.

What was lacking, according to a former member of the DPKO Gender Unit, was sufficient political support from the Department's leadership and military components, as well as that of the member states controlling the budget and determining the formal priorities of the DPKO. This perspective was confirmed by two other DPKO employees, who argued that the Women, Peace, and Security agenda was much less accepted when the DPKO gender advisor first initiated the gender guidelines. This would change over the next couple of years.

You need to have the right time politically, the money, people's understanding. Remember, in 2005 gender wasn't as advanced as it is now<sup>16</sup>.

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<sup>15</sup> Member of the DPKO Gender Unit.

<sup>16</sup> Member of the DPKO Gender Unit.



In 2007 the conversation about the gender guidelines was brought up again, both by the DPKO gender advisor and other stakeholders<sup>17</sup>. At that point the Gender Unit was still very small. According to a former member of the Gender Unit, it consisted of only “one person, [name of gender advisor] and a consultant [...], and an administrative assistant”, but there had been a marked change in how gender issues were perceived, both among member states and in the DPKO. A former member of the Gender Unit highlights the efforts of the person who were the Department’s gender advisor at the time, lobbying for both funding and political support. Her work was also emphasized by two current members of the Gender Unit. However, the gender advisor also relied on the help of other stakeholders to advocate the need for military gender guidelines.

## **5.5 Alliance-building**

Supporters of the Women, Peace, and Security agenda among member states, international and national NGOs other parts of the UN organization also lobbied those more reluctant among the member states and in the UN system<sup>18</sup>.

...the NGO community has been very active; they have lobbied a great deal... Several member states have also contributed... the EU-group, for example, in C34, and also Australia. Several of these groups have worked all the time in order to get [gender on the agenda of C34]<sup>19</sup>.

The result was that gender training and the Women, Peace and Security Resolutions finally became a part of the yearly report by the General Assembly’s Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (C34), which sets the official priorities of the DPKO. A former member of the Gender Unit maintained that this report informs the priorities of the DPKO also in practice, which is why the different teams work so hard to get their agenda included in it.

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<sup>17</sup> There is some disagreement between my informants as to who initiated the process the second time. One of the Norwegian bureaucrats interviewed for this thesis suggested that another UN agency had advocated the DPKO to develop military guidelines. Another Norwegian bureaucrat argued that the process had been initiated because of advocacy by UN staff and military personnel in the field. A former and two current members of the Gender Unit pointed to the DPKO gender advisor.

<sup>18</sup> According to two current and one former member of the DPKO Gender Team. This was also confirmed by two of the Norwegian bureaucrats.

<sup>19</sup> Former member of the Gender Unit.

The additional tasks meant that the already overworked Gender Advisor needed a more substantial team<sup>20</sup>. To achieve this, the gender team relied on supporters among the member states. The Gender Unit was expanded with one person over the regular budget approved by the General Assembly's Fifth Committee. Going through the regular budget process is, however, considered the most difficult way to expand your team.

Had we gone through the regular budget process in the UN, then we hadn't been anywhere near where we are now...it is just so much competition [for funds]<sup>21</sup>.

The competition to be in the budget proposed by the DPKO is only the first hurdle. According to a former member of the Gender Unit, it is also difficult to get increases in personnel past the Fifth Committee of the General Assembly who authorizes the DPKO's budgets. They would therefore also ask member states benevolent to the Women, Peace, and Security agenda to sponsor new positions outside the regular budgets.

...parts of the DPKO chooses to go directly to donors [for funds]<sup>22</sup>. "Norway, Sweden, Finland [...] the Netherlands, [and] the UK are the primary supporters of the [Gender] Team". Sometimes, these temporary positions become such an integral part of the organization structure that they are eventually funded over the regular budget, but most of the time this does not happen. The Unit is consequently very vulnerable to changes in donor priorities<sup>23</sup>.

The Gender Unit also made use of support from within the DPKO. According to two current members of the Gender Unit, promoting gender issues within the organization is very much dependent on the commitment and connections of individuals. Or as a current member of the gender team phrased it, "getting the right people at the right time". This view is confirmed by a former member of the Gender Unit, who described how the former Under-Secretary-General and one of his special assistants became increasingly attentive to gender issues, something that had positive effects for the

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<sup>20</sup> A former member of the Gender Unit described the gender advisor as "desperate".

<sup>21</sup> Former member of the Gender Unit.

<sup>22</sup> Former member of the Gender Unit.

<sup>23</sup> According to a former member of the Gender Unit.

Women, Peace, and Security agenda both within the organization, and among the member states.

Effective advocacy was also dependent on reformulating the abstract ideas about gender and equality featured in the Resolutions into concrete measures that seemed relevant to military personnel who often had little prior knowledge about these types of issues. The Gender Unit often cooperated with designated military personnel to create a common frame of reference with military audiences. Sometimes, relying on someone with a military rank was mandatory to get the message through.

...when working in the field, you do come up against people who simply don't want to take you seriously [...]. If you're talking to the military, doesn't matter how justified, [...] if you're not wearing a uniform, they tend to not listen to you anyway. And I think that's why it's critical to get [...] men in uniform talking to men in uniform, because then they listen<sup>24</sup>.

A current member of the Gender Team had seen this in practice more than once, and provided the following example.

When we went to Darfur, we went in pairs, always a military person and a civilian. We sat around the table and my colleague was with me, who was a man, but wasn't wearing his uniform, he's a colonel [...] there were ten military officers around the table. The dismissiveness of them at first was quite appalling, until he turned around and said that his name was Colonel [...], and then they started listening [...]. It wasn't about him being a man, but it was about him being a soldier [...] and that is critical.

In addition to working with military staff and member states, the Gender Unit consulted with civilian personnel from peacekeeping missions and other UN organizations. In 2008 UNIFEM<sup>25</sup>, DPKO and DFS, on behalf of UN Action<sup>26</sup>, organized a conference to discuss military peacekeepers' role in protecting women and girls from sexual violence (UNIFEM 2008). The conference was attended by high-level military staff from UN peacekeeping missions and defense ministries of member states, UN personnel from relevant departments, including the DPKO and members of

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<sup>24</sup> Current member of the Gender Unit.

<sup>25</sup> United Nations Development Fund for Women

<sup>26</sup> The aim of UN Action Against Sexual Violence in Conflict is to coordinate the efforts of the UN entities working to combat sexual violence in war (UN Action 2010).

the NGO community. The point of the conference was to learn about existing efforts by military peacekeepers, but also to establish agreement about the political agenda<sup>27</sup>. UNIFEM and UN Action continued the “analytical inventory” of existing efforts by military peacekeepers without the DPKO. These efforts were later incorporated into the guidelines<sup>28</sup>.

The Gender Unit was by then writing drafts of the gender guidelines. Moreover, the Working Group, which included members of the OMA, had been established. This made sure that the people who, together with the Gender Unit, were eventually going to implement the guidelines at the headquarters level were involved in the writing process<sup>29</sup>. Before beginning the consultation and validation process described in the gender guidelines the Working Group also consulted further with high-level military staff from ongoing peace operations who would be responsible for implementation in the field<sup>30</sup>.

In other words, the Gender Team created alliances with member states and UN civilian and military personnel in order to convince other members of the same groups of the importance of the military gender guidelines. However, inclusion was also done out of necessity; without it, those who would eventually implement the guidelines would not perceive the guidelines as legitimate. Moreover, both creating and maintaining these alliances demanded pragmatism and willingness to compromise.

### **5.5.1 Compromising to Create and Maintain Alliances**

The DPKO Gender Team wished to include as many of the central stakeholders as possible early in the process, including military personnel at the UN headquarters, representatives from TCCs, donor countries and the civilian and military parts of peacekeeping missions. Through their input and reviews, the finished product would reflect the political and practical reservations that would otherwise obstruct

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<sup>27</sup> According to one of the Norwegian bureaucrats and the summary of the official conference report (Goetz & Anderson 2008)

<sup>28</sup> According to a current member of the DPKO Gender Unit and one of the Norwegian bureaucrats.

<sup>29</sup> According to a current employee at the Office of Military Affairs and a member of the DPKO Gender Unit.

implementation<sup>31</sup>. The inclusive process was also meant to give the main stakeholders a sense of ownership to the gender guidelines and the implementation process.

...yes, this was the process by which we sought to ensure ownership by [the military] and by these member states. And the feedback we've received so far is quite positive...<sup>32</sup>.

Without it, the process would collapse the moment the Gender Unit and other advocates stopped pushing<sup>33</sup>. However, this also meant being pragmatic about what the finished gender guidelines would look like. One of the Norwegian bureaucrats interviewed stressed that including TCCs in a process such as this necessitates humility.

Yeah, you have to be modest and recognize what [the TCCs] can contribute with. There is no point in having Indians and Bangladeshis sit and listen to some guy from the UN [headquarters] telling them how to do things in the Congo, when it is the Indians who have had the MONUC<sup>34</sup> police commissioner in the DRC for many years<sup>35</sup>.

Two of the current members of the Gender Unit also emphasized the importance of basing the guidelines on the experiences of those in the field. However, TCCs and UN personnel often had differing experiences from the field and contradicting perspectives on the Resolutions. Moreover, creating the guidelines had to include perspectives from other important stakeholders as well, such as donor countries<sup>36</sup>. In order to balance these perspectives, the finished text had to be vague enough to be politically viable, but concrete enough to make them relevant for peacekeepers on the ground. For the DPKO personnel coordinating the process and writing the guidelines this often implied cutting measures they considered important and continuous rewrites. The guidelines have accordingly received some criticism for being toothless and vague<sup>37</sup>.

As mentioned above, the validation process included visits to several missions and input from all, as well as a large session in December 2009, where the TCCs could

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<sup>31</sup> According to two of the current members of the Gender Unit.

<sup>32</sup> Interviewee from the OMA.

<sup>33</sup> According to two current members of the Gender Unit and one of the interviewees from the OMA.

<sup>34</sup> The United Nations Mission in DR Congo.

<sup>35</sup> My translation.

<sup>36</sup> According to two informants currently working in the Gender Unit.

<sup>37</sup> This criticism was raised by two of the Norwegian bureaucrats.

review the draft of the guidelines. The sessions included representatives from Rwanda, Senegal, Nigeria, France, Mali, Bangladesh, Pakistan and India. “Basically three from each region of troop contributing countries”<sup>38</sup>. The consultation and review process drastically altered the draft of the guidelines<sup>39</sup>.

My goodness, [we made] incredible, incredible changes. From the very first draft until now, it’s not anything like it was. I mean, you’re putting in the things that you do, but then they say no [...] Things that you may want, but wouldn’t be possible... We’ve been through, I think, ten drafts... [It] will probably change again before it’s published this month<sup>40</sup>.

The alterations were made as a result of practical, budgetary or political obstacles and objections from those who were consulted as a part of the process. Practical obstacles were explained as measures that seemed like a good idea in New York, but would not be feasible in the field, such as having “medical gynecologists on [all] level two hospitals”<sup>41</sup>. Budgetary objections included initiatives that were too expensive to include in all UN peace missions. Political objections were directed at efforts that could not be implemented because they were not included in mission mandates, and were not likely to ever be because of opposition from certain TCCs and other member states. These objections were sometimes linked to broader issues that are contentious for some member states, such as women’s empowerment and human security<sup>42</sup>, which I will return to later in this chapter. These objections, however, eventually became less prominent due to events and advocacy outside the DPKO, things which are also easier for the DPKO team to find supporters among the stakeholders.

### **5.5.2 Change in the Normative Context**

The DPKO team’s strategic alliance building benefited from the advocacy of supporters of the Women, Peace, and Security Resolutions outside the DPKO and

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<sup>38</sup> Current member of the DPKO Gender Unit.

<sup>39</sup> I was not able to obtain concrete examples of what specific actors had asked them to change, despite much prodding.

<sup>40</sup> Current member of the DPKO Gender Unit.

<sup>41</sup> Example by current member of the DPKO Gender Unit.

<sup>42</sup> According to two current and one former member of the DPKO Gender Team, as well as all but one of my informants among Norwegian bureaucrats and diplomats.

events outside the DPKO staff's control, which changed the normative context of their efforts.

For instance, the particular vulnerability of women and girls in violent conflict made the international agenda as a result of graphic media and NGO reports of sexual violence, especially from the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The moral imperative of "doing something" to end the war rapes in the DRC was mentioned by all my informants. It was also argued that media attention about these issues had greatly boosted the number of supporters of the Women, Peace, and Security agenda. Because of the increased attention and pressure, the agenda gained an increasing number of supporters willing to exert their influence on the agenda's behalf, most notably the USA. The increasing willingness by governments to fund related projects also attracted a number of NGOs to the movement, which again made sure to increase the attention and pressure further<sup>43</sup>. The DPKO team's advocacy of the development of gender guidelines for military peacekeepers was in other words a part of a much wider effort by various actors among member states, NGOs and within the UN structure to get the Women, Peace, and Security Resolutions implemented. As described in the background chapter of this thesis, this was a coordinated effort to get UNSCR 1325 adopted, which only expanded after the initial victory. The DPKO Gender Unit was a part of this informal alliance. According to a current member of the OMA and all the Norwegian bureaucrats and diplomats interviewed for this thesis, the result of these efforts was that the Resolutions could no longer be ignored, and member states that in reality might oppose them, had to at least pay rhetorical homage to their central tenets. The consequence for the staff advocating the gender guidelines for military peacekeepers was increased recognition from both the member states responsible for their budgets and official priorities and among the DPKO leadership.

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<sup>43</sup> According to one of the Norwegian bureaucrats.

### 5.5.3 Lack of Coordination

At the same time as the advocates progressed in influencing the attitudes of central stakeholders, they also became increasingly divided. The prominence of UNSCR 1820 and 1888 over the rest of the Resolutions led to disagreement, reinforcing tensions that already existed. While NGOs, member states and UN personnel cooperate in their efforts to get the Women, Peace, and Security Resolutions recognized and implemented, these efforts have at times been characterized by a *lack of coordination*<sup>44</sup>. According to one of the former members of the Gender Unit, the UN effort to implement the Resolutions have been characterized by clashes over responsibilities, funds and strong personalities, something that might have undermined the lobbying power of the movement. One of the Norwegian scholars interviewed for this thesis argued that signs of this could be found in the two Resolutions that were adopted in 2009; UNSCR 1888, which focuses on sexual violence, was both more concrete and more rhetorically forceful compared to UNSCR 1889, which highlights women's empowerment and participation. Two of the interviewees currently working in the DPKO Gender Team implicitly elaborated on the effects of this division. They described how certain measures in the two latest Resolutions that the DPKO was to become responsible for, had been successfully advocated by an alliance of NGOs and another UN organization. While the DPKO personnel lauded their general lobbying efforts, they argued that these measures would only duplicate efforts already in place in missions and would result in time and funds spent placating unnecessary instructions.

Both the current and the former members of the Gender Unit expressed frustration over the influence of UN organizations and NGOs without contact with the people working in peacekeeping missions. The result could sometimes be instructions and demands that were not possible to implement in the field, which complicated the relationship between advocates in different UN entities, as well as the Gender Team's relationship and legitimacy with military and civilian peacekeepers who had to implement these measures. A former member of the DPKO Gender Unit mentioned the increasing call for more reporting as an instruction that could counteract effective

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<sup>44</sup> According to one of the former members of the DPKO Gender Team. All my Norwegian informants confirmed this view.



implementation. While she held that reporting was an important responsibility, the gender teams in the field spent an increasing amount of time reporting on issues that are exceedingly difficult to measure.

...those poor people out there, who already are completely overworked, if you ask them to report twice as much as they do today it is obvious that they will soon have time to do nothing but report. And this is just one example of how differently we see these things. Still, I get where they're coming from [...], I mean, much is being done in the field but from the HQ it might seem as if nothing is happening [...]<sup>45</sup>.

Many in the NGO community also had unrealistic expectations when it came to what could possibly be achieved within the political constraints the DPKO faced from the member states.

I mean, you engage, you consult, but you certainly can't have activists making policy, who don't understand the UN, don't understand the political ramifications, don't understand any of these things. You can consult, absolutely, but you can't have them leading UN agencies. That just doesn't make sense!<sup>46</sup>

The result is that parts of the NGO community criticize the UN rather than the member states that could actually rectify the situation.

...what they fail to do is say: the UN is made up of my country, my country isn't going fast enough, I'm not giving enough troops, I'm not giving enough money. Because the UN isn't on its own. It's made up of the countries that all of these activists live in and therefore they need to be pushing their own countries to move forward [...]. [We] can only go as far as the member states allows. And that's the problem, that people seem to think that the UN is a separate entity to everything else and it's not<sup>47</sup>.

However, according to one of the former members of the Gender Team, the DPKO team was as guilty of protecting their own interests and resources as other UN organizations, thereby contributing to the division of the alliance.

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<sup>45</sup> Former member of the DPKO Gender Unit.

<sup>46</sup> Current member of the DPKO Gender Unit. This point was also brought up by one of the other current members.

<sup>47</sup> Current member of the DPKO Gender Unit. This was corroborated by another current member and one of the former members.

I'm sorry to say that the DPKO sometimes have been too much "no, this is our thing" [when other UN organizations try to get involved in gender related peacekeeping tasks]. It really is ridiculous, but these things become hugely important...

This frustration and division is, on the other hand, described as insignificant compared to the benefits of the other advocates pushing the Woman, Peace, and Security agenda. The UN is also currently working to integrate the efforts of the different parts of the organization into the new entity UN Women. My informants from the Gender Team hoped this would make the lack of coordination less of a problem <sup>48</sup>.

Persistence and alliance building helped the DPKO team gather political and financial support, as well as contribute to the legitimacy of the military gender guidelines. The goal was to create long-term changes in both the attitudes and practice of the DPKO and the other central stakeholders and the tenets of the Women, Peace, and Security agenda had to become integrated into the institutional framework and formal procedures of peacekeeping operations. Consequently, all the stakeholders involved had to perceive the Resolutions as legitimate and important. That way, implementation would continue even if the outside pressure desisted. In order to achieve this among stakeholders who initially disagreed to the agenda, the DPKO team used *framing*.

## 5.6 Framing

Framing as a strategy was central in both stages of the development process. In order to gain permission to develop gender guidelines at all, the team had to overcome both political obstacles and untangle confusion about what the Women, Peace, and Security agenda really meant to military peacekeepers. Framing was central to achieving this. The strategy also remained important afterwards, when the guidelines were developed.

More specifically, the Gender Unit reframed the Women, Peace, and Security Resolutions from a normative question to an agenda that was of strategic advantage to military peacekeepers. As stated by one of the current members of the Gender team:

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<sup>48</sup> The new gender architecture, later named UN Women, was mentioned as a possible remedy by all my informants formerly or currently working in the Gender Team, as well as by the Norwegian scholars and one of the bureaucrats.

...you have to prove that there is an added value. Especially when you are talking to military types or the police, you have to [explain] what is the added value. It isn't about [the number of women or] equality in it self, it's about saying, you can for instance search women, there's a strategic objective to it all, there is an operational objective to it...

Accordingly, the Gender Team can argue that implementing the Resolutions in the work of military peacekeepers is not only instructed by the Security Council, it will in fact help military peacekeepers to accomplish other tasks which were considered to be important among reluctant member states and military personnel. This gave the agenda legitimacy among people who had disregarded it before.

I think you always have to make a valid justification of the linkage to make it understood, otherwise it's not getting credibility. Gender isn't automatically a credible subject as it is.<sup>49</sup>

Both the current and the former members of the Gender Team argued the shift from a rights-based approach to a focus on operational efficiency ensured that the agenda got “the grown-up table's attention”<sup>50</sup>. Reframing the Women, Peace, and Security Resolutions as essential for operational success helped the DPKO reduce the influence of three of the factors that initially contributed to resistance against the agenda from some of the stakeholders: conceptual confusion, resistance against women's empowerment and the “protection of civilians” agenda.

### **5.6.1 Conceptual Confusion**

According to one of the interviewees from OMA, the initial resistance among most military stakeholders and some of the member states was more due to *conceptual confusion* than to actual dissent. Two of the interviewees from the OMA argued that many among the military personnel had problems seeing how the Resolutions were relevant for their work and how they could be effectively operationalized. Translating the Resolutions into language that made sense for military personnel was therefore an important step to gaining their political support.

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<sup>49</sup> Current member of the Gender Team.

<sup>50</sup> Current member of the Gender Team.

We've had 10 years of training and discussing and developing training modules, and all differed kinds of publications, not just from peacekeeping but the wider UN and international community on Resolution 1325, so it's [no longer] an issue of ignorance at all... [Now] everybody knows about gender mainstreaming, pretty much...<sup>51</sup>

However, information about the Resolutions was not enough. A former member of the Gender Team stressed that the initial resistance could also be traced back to the early advocates' failure to make the Resolutions relevant for those who did not automatically agree.

A lot of these women came from the NGO community, they knew a lot about women's rights and so on, [they were more] watchdogs than communicators. It's pretty obvious that when you are talking to a general, it might not be the best idea to bang your fist on the table and say that this is my right just as much as yours, women and men are equal [...]. How you present things is important.

However, the Resolutions also faced political resistance.

### **5.6.2 Resistance against Women's Empowerment**

As described above, attitudes towards the Women, Peace, and Security agenda among member states, DPKO and military personnel were diverse, and varied from strong supporters to outright opponents. The Resolutions were, however, not equally controversial. The Women, Peace, and Security Resolutions prescribe both measures to empower and protect women. UNSCR 1820 and 1888, focusing solely on sexual and gender-based violence, receive more political and financial support by important member states<sup>52</sup>. UNSCR 1325 and 1889, which focuses more clearly on promoting women's participation and empowerment were much more contentious. According to two of the informants currently working in the DPKO Gender Unit, this was due to *resistance against women's empowerment*.

I think that there are some people who find the elements of empowerment a little frightening [...] I think there is a lot of money [going] into sexual violence, again, because it's about women as victims.

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<sup>51</sup> Current employee at the OMA.

<sup>52</sup> According to two informants currently working in the Gender Unit, as well as the Norwegian scholars, diplomats and two of the bureaucrats.

It is about doing something to help protect [them]. I think that when you ask for money to build up systems to push women to be in political parties or to have political caucuses, I think then you're going to get resistance, because empowerment is very difficult...<sup>53</sup>

The result of this resistance can be seen in what projects the member states are willing to back politically and financially.

[If you want to include women] into peace agreements and not have amnesties for perpetrators, you are probably going to get a lot of resistance from a lot of people, [...] you're not going to get funding to do that. But if you want to set up a women's shelter or you want medical equipment for women, absolutely, nobody would have a problem with that<sup>54</sup>.

Also many of the stakeholders supporting the Resolutions favor efforts to combat sexual violence over the rest of the Women, Peace and Security agenda. Most influential among these is the USA, but also large parts of the NGO community and several UN organizations encourage this focus<sup>55</sup>. This is not a view shared by the DPKO or the Norwegian bureaucrats interviewed for this thesis. They, along with many in the NGO community, hold that that sexual violence can only be prevented through women's empowerment. As stated by one of the current members of the DPKO Gender Unit:

...it was never supposed to be either 1325 or 1820, but now [...] the community has been galvanized towards one or the other. And I think that's a very, very, very dangerous road to go down and I'm surprised that anybody who works in gender would push for that. Because [...] they cannot be addressed individually, they must be addressed as a composite of the whole thing. A holistic approach.

However, the DPKO team also had allies both among the member states and in the NGO community supporting for the empowerment mandates of the Resolutions. Many of these supporters were also supporters of the "protection of civilians" agenda<sup>56</sup>, which was opposed by many member states.

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<sup>53</sup> Member of the DPKO Gender Unit. Another interviewee from the Gender Team also stressed this point.

<sup>54</sup> Same member of the DPKO Gender Unit.

<sup>55</sup> According to two informants currently working in the Gender Unit and one of the Norwegian bureaucrats.

<sup>56</sup> According to the Norwegian diplomats.

### 5.6.3 “Protection of Civilians”

Many important TCCs and other member states initially perceived the Women, Peace, and Security Resolutions as a part of the “*protection of civilians*” agenda<sup>57</sup>, of which they were highly critical. The agenda, promoted by a number of member states and NGOs, argues that the humanitarian needs of civilians trumps consent, impartiality and the use of force only in self-protection as the central principles of peacekeeping. The opponents, many of whom have a history as colonies, fear that the agenda will be used to promote neo-imperialism and control over countries in the Global South<sup>58</sup>.

Opposition to the “protection of civilians” agenda resulted in much initial skepticism to the Women, Peace, and Security Resolutions. The consequence was that the DPKO Gender Unit was met with much resistance from these stakeholders when they initiated the military gender guidelines and other implementation efforts in the years after the adoption of UNSCR 1325<sup>59</sup>. While this tension was never resolved, it became less prominent as the Women, Peace, and Security agenda became more widely accepted among member states. The interviews with informants from both the DPKO and Norway all describe how in the years after 2005 the ideas promoted in the Resolutions became an international trend, which also greatly influenced the DPKO team’s efforts to dispel the resistance against women’s empowerment and conceptual confusion.

### 5.6.4 Framing in the Second Stage of the Development Process

Using framing to overcome conceptual confusion, resistance against women’s empowerment and the “protection of civilians” agenda was most prominent in the first stage of the development process, when the Gender Unit tried to gain permission to create gender guidelines. However, the strategy remained important later in the development process because of the turnover among personnel both in the UN and

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<sup>57</sup> Explained in chapter 1 of this thesis.

<sup>58</sup> According to one of the former members of the DPKO Gender Team. This was confirmed by all the Norwegian bureaucrats, diplomats and scholars.

<sup>59</sup> According to one of the former members of the DPKO Gender Team. This was confirmed by all the Norwegian bureaucrats, diplomats and scholars.

among the alliance partners<sup>60</sup>. As a consequence, the DPKO team had to continuously build support for the agenda.

The finished guidelines indicate that this work will remain important also in the third stage of implementing the guidelines. In addition to stressing that the Resolutions are instructions from the Security Council, the gender guidelines are scattered with what the Gender Unit staff referred to as “added value” justifications. This is especially the case when it comes to employing female peacekeepers, but also as a reason for why women’s organizations should be consulted by peacekeeping missions. The part of the guidelines aimed at strategic planning at the headquarters level for instance states:

Women and men may have access to different kinds and sources of information relating to security risks and threats in the area of operation. Consequently, to obtain a holistic overview of the security environment, planning processes for UN peacekeeping missions need to consult and draw on the perspectives of both women and men... (DPKO/DFS 2010: 8).

Another example is aimed at the operational level of peacekeeping missions:

UN-CIMIC<sup>61</sup> activities to promote confidence-building with the local population can be effectively implemented through consultations between the military and local women’s organizations in the area of operations (DPKO/DFS 2010: 17).

Also the guidelines for the tactical level of operations in the field was characterized by this type of framing:

The deployment of mixed teams [which includes both women and men] can lead to better military-community interaction and dispel any mistrust between the UN military and the local community. By way of example, it could guard against fears of sexual exploitation and abuse of women and girls in the local population by military peacekeepers (DPKO/DFS 2010: 21).

## **5.7 Completing the Gender Guidelines**

Seen together, the descriptions provided by the interviewees and the finished gender guidelines indicate that the DPKO staff had strategies to advance their agenda during

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<sup>60</sup> According to a current member of the Gender Unit.

<sup>61</sup> CIMIC is an acronym for civil-military cooperation.

the first two steps of the development process. The DPKO leadership approved the final guidelines in March 2010 (DPKO/DFS 2010: 1). The next step of the process is the implementation of the guidelines in UN peacekeeping missions and at the DPKO headquarters in New York. The implementation in the field will be the responsibility of the military components of the peacekeeping missions, assisted by the mission Gender Advisors<sup>62</sup>. In New York, OMA and the Gender Unit will mainstream the gender guidelines into the existing framework for planning peacekeeping missions<sup>63</sup>. After three years, the gender guidelines will be evaluated, and revised if necessary<sup>64</sup>.

Both getting permission and developing the guidelines depended on the member states and staff in other parts of the UN system, who also influenced the finished guidelines. Their resistance and the other obstacles described in this chapter might help explain the slow pace of implementing the Women, Peace, and Security Resolutions at the DPKO.

### **5.8 The Interviewees' Assessment of the Pace of Implementation**

The interviewees currently or formerly working at the DPKO argued that the criticism against the slow pace of implementing the Women, Peace and Security Resolutions was unreasonable to some degree. As stated by a former member of the Gender Unit:

If you look at the entire UN system [...] the DPKO is in my opinion the UN entity that achieved the most. They have actually done the most [to implement the Women, Peace and Security Resolutions]. ...they now have the formal stuff in place, and many don't have that. They also have gender advisors in place in all their operations.

They also acknowledged that the UN is slow to incorporate new ideas and that this was partly a result of internal features of the organization itself. However, they all agreed that the resistance among member states and other central stakeholders were equally or more to blame. The interviewees among Norwegian scholars, bureaucrats and diplomats largely agreed with this stance.

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<sup>62</sup> According to a current member of the OMA.

<sup>63</sup> According to a current member of the OMA.

<sup>64</sup> According to two informants currently working in the Gender Unit.



Examining the criticism mounted against the implementation process at the DPKO is the focus of the next chapter, where I elaborate on how these empirical findings answer my primary and theoretical research questions and how these answers might help explain the belated Women, Peace, and Security implementing process.

## **6. Implications of Empirical Findings**

The focus of this chapter is to examine the slow implementation of the Women, Peace, and Security Resolutions at the DPKO, despite the UN's rhetorical affirmation of this agenda. But first I elaborate on how the empirical findings from the last chapter answer my primary and theoretical research questions. As stated in the introduction, the primary research questions guiding this thesis are: What strategies did the team responsible for coordinating the implementation of the Women, Peace and Security Resolutions at the DPKO employ in their effort to implement this agenda in the work of military peacekeepers? And what contextual issues and actors did they see as constraining or aiding them in their effort? The aim of my theoretical research question is to understand in what ways member states shapes the actions of IO staff and whether IO staff can act independently from them. In order to answer these questions, I discuss my findings with regard to the theoretical perspectives presented in chapter three. I then return to how these answers help explain the belated implementation process.

### **6.1 Strategies, Obstacles and Resistance to Creating Military Gender Guidelines**

My informants' descriptions of the process of developing the gender guidelines convey that they had three principal strategies to get permission and develop the DPKO/DFS Gender Guidelines: persistence, alliance building and framing.

Persistent lobbying of member states and the DPKO leadership was one of these strategies. Neorealists and neo-liberalists portray states' interests as innate and contend that these direct IOs' agendas. Barnett and Finnemore (2004) Joachim (2003) and Weaver (2008), on the other hand, all consider IOs to have interests independent from those of states and explore how actors' interests and agendas are constructed and changeable, either through changes in circumstances or because they are influenced by other actors. According to Joachim (2003) advocacy over time might benefit from events and changes in issues' context, which changes how issues are perceived. This

view of interests as malleable to changes in issues' normative context resonates with the descriptions of my interviewees who described how reports of extreme levels of sexual violence in the DRC made parts of the Women, Peace and Security agenda more urgent among many of the central stakeholders the DPKO tried to influence in their efforts to develop the gender guidelines. If the interests of the member states were inherent, changes in the agenda's normative context would not have influenced their positions on the Resolutions.

Alliance building was the second strategy employed by the DPKO team. Like the NGOs in Joachim's (2003) article and the "norm entrepreneurs" in Finnemore and Sikkink's (1998) work, the DPKO staff formed alliances with partners who had more authority in the eyes of their audience in order to overcome resistance. One example is having military personnel convince other military personnel of the importance and usefulness of the Women, Peace, and Security agenda. Alliance partners among member states, NGOs and UN military personnel were also used to convince TCCs and other member states. Along the lines of Joachim (2003), I would argue that member states and other stakeholders both aided and restricted the DPKO team's framing efforts. However, cooperation and resistance is often not in accordance with the formal boundaries between IOs, NGOs and member states. Instead, alliances of actors from the UN, member states and civil society try to influence other actors from the UN, member states and civil society. In this latter group there are varying degrees and reasons for resistance. That is not conceivable within Barnett and Finnemore's (2004) theoretical framework, where IOs and member states are depicted as unitary, rational actors. My findings therefore support Weaver's (2008) view of IOs as a myriad of actors and units pursuing their own interests, as well as Seabrook and Tsingou's (2009) criticism that the principal weakness of Barnett and Finnemore's (2004) approach is that they insufficiently allow for the agency of IO staff.

The DPKO team also used framing, as explained by Barnett and Finnemore (2004). One example is how they reframed the Women, Peace, and Security Resolutions from a normative to a strategic question to make the Resolutions meaningful to audiences

that had earlier been uninterested in or skeptical of the agenda, either because of conceptual confusion or due to resistance against women's empowerment or the "protection of civilians" agenda.

The three strategies were used interdependently and can be seen as moments on a continuum. Framing efforts to persuade stakeholders among UN military staff and other UN personnel, as well as member states were more effective when they were done together with allies from these same groups. To persuade some representatives from the military and member states, this was in fact the only way to have legitimacy. Persistence would likewise not have been effective had it not been for the growing number of supporters among NGOs and member states and the increased media attention to the horrendous war rapes in the DRC, which changed the political and normative landscape of the Gender Team's advocacy. The DPKO staff's efforts were, in other words, aided by other stakeholders, such as staff from other parts of the DPKO, military and civilian staff in peacekeeping missions, members of the NGO community and member states supporting the Women, Peace, and Security agenda. This stands in contrast to the constructivist perspective that focuses on framing as the only tool IOs can make use of to influence member states and other stakeholders. I will elaborate on this criticism later in the chapter.

The informants' descriptions clearly show that other stakeholders also restricted the DPKO team's actions. The DPKO team had to work for a long time to gain permission from the DPKO leadership and member states to initiate the Gender Guidelines. To develop the guidelines, they depended on member states for funding and continued political support. Military and civilian staff at the DPKO, from peacekeeping missions and the TCCs also had much influence over the development process. The opinions of all these stakeholders strongly affected the final gender guidelines.

## **6.2 The Possibilities and Limits to the Agency of DPKO Staff**

In this section, I turn to the theoretical research question asking in what ways member states influence the actions of IO staff and whether IO staff can act independently from them.

The DPKO staff repeatedly stated that the UN was “owned” by the member states and that they determined the priorities of the staff. However, as described above the DPKO team made use of several strategies to pursue the military gender guidelines despite initial opposition from many member states. This would suggest that the DPKO have agency and interests independent from those of states.

Unlike neorealists/neo-liberals view of IO staff’s actions as automatic responses to the interests and instructions of states, my findings suggest that the member states are highly influential, but do not fully determine the DPKO staff’s interests and actions. According to Lipson (2007a), the member states influence the UN by being a part of the organization’s formal structure, as well as being its most important source of legitimacy and funding. His description is clearly echoed in my informants’ descriptions in that the DPKO team first needed the member states’ permission and funding to be able to initiate the development of the military gender guidelines. Later in the process, representatives from central TCCs and other member states reviewed and altered drafts of the guidelines. This was necessary because TCCs employ, supply and provide most of the training for UN military troops, and are thereby responsible for central tenets of the Resolutions, such as increasing the number of female peacekeepers and the pre-deployment gender training. Member states also funded and provided political support for the process. In other words, their approval of the guidelines was necessary if they were to be implemented. The inclusions of central TCCs also legitimized the guidelines in the eyes of other TCCs and member states, and other parts of the DPKO. Lipson (2007a) designates member states as the primary source of legitimacy for the UN. However, both the Gender Team and the informants among Norwegian bureaucrats included other groups as important sources of legitimacy for the DPKO team’s work. They especially pointed to representatives from the NGO community and other parts of the UN, such as high-level military and

civilian personnel from peacekeeping missions. Certain types of experience gave the holders' opinions additional credibility, such as a military background or experience from the field. Consulting with military and civilian peacekeepers from existing missions consequently served to increase the legitimacy of the final guidelines in the eyes of the implementing stakeholders in the field and among TCCs and donor countries.

Some of the Norwegian scholars and bureaucrats interviewed for this thesis suggested that the conflicting demands of the different stakeholders contributed to a toothless and vague set of finished guidelines. The interviewees from the DPKO did not corroborate this view. Rather, they argued that without this inclusive process aimed at creating ownership and legitimacy to the guidelines among the central stakeholders and making sure that the guidelines were politically, economically and practically feasible, they would have been without much practical value, as they would not have been implemented in practice.

My findings do not, on the other hand, support Lipson's (2007a) depiction of the UN as a unitary structure, without much room for the agency of UN personnel. The lack of coordination and disagreement between the different UN agencies when it comes to the implementation of the Women, Peace, and Security Resolutions, confirms Weaver's (2008) and Brunsson's (2002) argument that organizations should not be analyzed as unitary entities. Rather, they are comprised of a number of units and agents, all with distinct interests and agendas.

### **6.2.1 The Dangers of Overemphasizing Framing as a Strategy**

While my findings coincides with Barnett and Finnemore's (2004) and Weaver's (2008) portrayal of IO staff as agents strategically working to advance their agendas, they do not correspond with Barnett and Finnemore's (2004) singular focus on framing as a strategy to influence other stakeholders, disregarding the importance of alliances and changes in the normative context outside of IO staff's control. According to this

perspective, whether framing efforts are successful depend only on the IO's authority in the relationship with the stakeholder it is trying to influence and whether the actor's strategic interests or other stakeholders with more situational authority do not contradict this authority. The result is that successful framing efforts always seem like the result of the framers' persuasive power and authority. While the DPKO team succeeded in creating military gender guidelines this might not have been the case if framing was the only available strategy, because on its own, the DPKO team could influence some, but not all, of the stakeholder determining the outcome.

This is probably because compared to the IOs portrayed by Barnett and Finnemore (2004) the DPKO team had much less authority vis-à-vis the audiences they had to convince. Following the definitions provided by Barnett & Finnemore (2004) successful framing of the Women, Peace, and Security Resolutions when it comes to military peacekeepers would imply establishing that they are important and relevant for military peacekeepers, describing what military peacekeepers should do to implement them, who military contingents should be composed of and so on. The actual implementation of these instructions would then be carried out by OMA, the military contingents in missions and the TCCs. According to Barnett and Finnemore (2004) these audiences would comply if the DPKO team had rational-legal, moral, expert or delegated authority. In the beginning of the process, few of the authorizing or implementing agencies and actors thought the Women, Peace and Security agenda was important or they outright disagreed to its central tenets. The combined lobbying effort of member states, the NGO community and various UN agencies provided the DPKO Gender Team with permission to create guidelines, not the efforts of the Gender Unit alone. Moreover, the necessity of reframing the Resolutions from a normative to a strategic agenda indicates that the DPKO team did not have moral authority that trumped the reservations of the stakeholders. While the DPKO team had been delegated the responsibility of writing the guidelines and coordinating the validation and review process, the demands for revisions by member states and military and civilian field personnel, indicate that while the team was seen as experts on gender, other types of expertise, such as field experience or military expertise was considered

more important. Among many military peacekeepers, military experience was needed to give weight to the DPKO team's arguments. The team's solution to their own insufficient authority was building alliances with actors who had authority relevant to the audiences they were trying to convince. Despite these efforts, the resistance against women's empowerment and the "protection of civilians" agenda could still prevent implementation among some TCCs. Continued or increasing division between the Resolutions' advocates can also provide obstacles for effective implementation. However, this part of the process has only just begun.

Barnett and Finnemore's (2004) constructivist understanding of power and authority implies that authority is not fixed or always obeyed. The descriptions of the process of developing the military gender guidelines provide just one example of the interactive relationship between states and IO personnel. It is possible that IO staff have greater authority over other issues and in other situations. Moreover, the contest over who gets to frame the implications of the Women, Peace, and Security Resolutions for military peacekeepers is not over, and the relative levels of authority between the DPKO team and the other implementing stakeholders might yet change. However, the alliance building that went into creating military gender guidelines at the DPKO also demonstrates that competition over framing attempts is not really between the DPKO on the one hand and member states on the other. Rather, alliances and opposition cut across the institutional divisions and the DPKO could "borrow" authority from more powerful stakeholders in order to advance their agenda. As such, whether or not IO staff have authority in their own right to influence how member states perceive and act on a specific issue, might not be that important.

These conclusions suggest that the explanation provided by the critics as to why the implementation process has been belated lacks central components, which will be laid out below.



### **6.3 Considering the Criticism against the Implementation Process**

As outlined in the background chapter the critics consider the implementation process to be inefficient, hampered by bias against gender issues, organizational inertia and a lack of coordination and a normative consensus regarding the Women, Peace, and Security agenda and peacekeeping more generally in the UN organization. Other critics also argue that the Women, Peace, and Security Resolutions themselves are insufficiently feminist and peace oriented. They especially react to the portrayal of the Resolutions as tools to help the UN more effectively perform other tasks.

The DPKO interviewees corroborate several of these explanatory factors as to why the implementation process is moving slowly, resulting in discrepancies between the organization's rhetoric and practice. The informants' descriptions highlight ignorance of or dissent to the importance of gender issues, inadequate funding and personnel, coordination difficulties between the different UN agencies and a general lack of normative consensus and political will in their explanations to why it was initially difficult to get the development process going. However, rather than taking the obstacles and resistance as a given, the DPKO gender unit worked to change them through various strategies. The alliance of member states, NGOs and UN agencies managed to get gender issues acknowledged as being important by an increasing number of member states and UN personnel. The DPKO team contributed this work in their own organization and among TCCs by reframing the Women, Peace, and Security Resolutions as a strategic, rather than a normative question. Combined with persistent lobbying, this contributed to slowly decreasing the conceptual confusion and increasing the perception of the Women, Peace, and Security agenda as important among military personnel and TCCs. However, these strategies also required much pragmatism and willingness to compromise regarding the final guidelines.

The lack of coordination between UN agencies remains a problem according to several of my informants. The ad-hoc nature of funding also makes the gender efforts at the DPKO vulnerable to changes in the member states' priorities, although there is no longer a lack of willing donors to these issues, at least at the headquarters level. In contrast to the analysis in the critical literature, my findings demonstrate that the

DPKO is open to implementing the Women, Peace, and Security Resolutions, and have made some progress, but that this is a slow, step-by-step process.

The informants also stress how much the different member states influenced all stages of the development process of the military gender guidelines, not only by controlling whether they got made, but also by reviewing and altering the guidelines themselves. While Anderlini (2007) includes an analysis of how women's empowerment and the "protection of civilians" agenda affected the implementation process, these political struggles are portrayed as more relevant for the implementation by member states than for the process in the UN. My findings suggest that these reservations also had great implications for the DPKO. In fact, rather than being a closed and static system, the DPKO can be described as an arena where actors from the UN system, the member states and the NGO community attempt to advance their own agendas and understanding of central political questions, including the Women, Peace, and Security agenda and the role and responsibilities of peacekeepers. While UNSCR 1325 was adopted unanimously in 2000, the struggle to define its meaning, its significance, how it should influence practice and how it relates to other issues is still going on. This may play out differently in the various departments and agencies of the UN, but at the DPKO member states have decisive influence over this framing process. The neglect to include this in the critical literature's analysis is also surprising considering the well-known political struggle that was behind the adaptation of UNSCR 1325, the initial Women, Peace, and Security Resolution. To argue that pressure from member states severely watered down the final Resolutions, while at the same time not allowing for the possibility that this may influence the implementation process as some of these writers do, is inconsistent. I would argue that the implementation of these Resolutions at the DPKO and in peacekeeping operations cannot be understood without analyzing the organization's integrated relationship with its member states and the rest of its political environment, including the activist community. It is in other words the same kind of compromises that went into placing gender issues on the agenda of the Security Council, alienating the more radical women's peace activists, that contributed to the slow implementation process at the DPKO.

Accordingly, while my informants corroborate much of the criticism waged at the implementation process, the critics fail to see these restrictions and obstacles as a starting point for negotiation, rather than a final outcome and moreover do not take the member states' and other actors' role in the process sufficiently into consideration.

## **7. Conclusion**

On the basis of the discussion in the previous chapter, I conclude that my findings have both theoretical implications and suggestions regarding the advocacy of the Women, Peace, and Security Resolutions.

### **7.1. Theoretical Implications**

The actions of the DPKO staff are not automatic responses to the interests and instructions of the UN member states. However, states have great influence on their work, both through their control of the DPKO's funding, formal priorities and as important sources of legitimacy. Donor countries and TCCs had a lot of influence on the final DPKO/DFS gender guidelines and the consideration for the member states' and the other stakeholders' wishes determined much of the development process. The member states are, on the other hand, not a homogeneous group. Among the member states, there were both skeptics and supporters of the Women, Peace, and Security Resolutions. Moreover, their stances were often pliable and the DPKO team used a number of strategies to win over new supporters. The team did not, however, have the authority to push this agenda without the help of their allies from both within and without the UN, even though they perceived their advocacy as an important contribution. This particular team and process is consequently not as powerful as the IOs and its staff depicted by the constructivist perspective on the IO-state relationship. However, Barnett and Finnemore (2004) stress that the authority of IOs depends on the issue, context and actors and consequently my findings do not contradict their analysis.

Both neorealists/neo-liberalists and constructivists use an analytical framework that discern sharply between IOs and member states. The interviewees and the completed gender guidelines contrastingly describes the DPKO as an arena where the member states are highly influential and integrated into formal decision making structures, much along the lines of the UN depicted in Lipson's (2007a) analysis. Differentiating so zealously might lead these perspectives to overlook how actors from both sides of

the IO-state division cooperate and make use of each other's authority to advance common agendas, which is crucial when analyzing organizational change and advocacy of norms such as the Women, Peace, and Security agenda.

## **7.2 Implications for Activists**

The process of implementing the Women, Peace, and Security Resolutions at the DPKO is moving slowly forward. While the critics of this process have argued that this is a result of organizational features and attitudes within the organization itself, this thesis holds that it is also because the implementation process is permeated by the stakeholders from the UN organization, peacekeeping missions and especially the member states. Consequently, implementing the Women, Peace, and Security Resolutions at the DPKO implies changing attitudes, culture and practice not only within the DPKO, but also those of the member states and military personnel in peacekeeping missions and at the DPKO headquarters in New York. If implementation is to happen at all, the process must be considered legitimate to these stakeholders, who fund and implement the agenda in practice. Their involvement has and will probably continue to make this a painstakingly slow process and also influence what the outcome will look like.

The DPKO staff working to implement the Women, Peace, and Security Resolutions, relies on supporters and allies in order to move this process forward. As such, fragmentation and lack of coordination of the alliance advocating this agenda from within and without the UN, could pose an equally great obstacle for effective implantation as bias against gender issues and organizational features within the UN and resistance from some member states.

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
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# Appendix I: Organizational Map of the DPKO and DFS



## ***Appendix II: Interview Guide***

### **Common topics for all interviews:**

- The criticism against the implementation of the Women, Peace and Security agenda at the UN/DPKO
- Possible obstacles to the implementation process
- The relationship between the DPKO and the TCCs and other important stakeholders, such as donor countries and the NGO community
- Gender perspectives as important to the operational efficiency of military peacekeepers

### **Additional topics for interviews with current and former DPKO personnel**

- Would you mind telling me about your own professional background before you came to the DPKO?
- Can you tell me about the process of creating the gender guidelines?
- What was your role in this process?
- How was other stakeholders such as the TCCs and field missions involved in this process?
- How do you work to influence TCCs and military actors to adopt a gender perspective?
- Pragmatism/Gender as added value to peacekeeping missions/speaking so that people with a military background will understand your perspective
- Are there any parts of the Women, Peace and Security agenda that is especially controversial among your partners? If so, how do you try to promote these issues?

*Not all of these topics/questions were brought up at every interview. In most interviews I also included three or four specific questions tailored to the particular informant.*

## ***Appendix III a: Letter to Informants (English)***

Thank you very much for being willing to participate in this interview.

The interviews will provide the most important source of data for my Master's thesis, which I am currently writing as a part of my Master's degree in Peace and Conflict Studies at the University of Oslo, Norway. I am also a student fellow and research assistant at the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI).

In my thesis, I examine how the Department of Peace Keeping Operation's Gender Team (DPKO) works to implement the Security Council Resolutions on women, peace and security. More specifically, I focus on how the DPKO work with troop contributing countries, donor countries, as well as other parts of the UN to achieve this objective. I also wish to understand how the Gender Team perceives their own influence over this process.

I will ask you at the beginning of the interview for permission to record our conversation, so that nothing of importance will be missed. These recordings will later be transcribed. Both the recording and the transcription will be destroyed after the thesis is completed and graded. The finished thesis will, however, be accessible at the university library, as well as published on the internet.

My aim is to preserve the anonymity of the people I interview for this thesis. No names of interviewees will appear either in my notes, or in the recorded or transcribed interviews. Beside myself, the only one who will have access to this material is the external examiner for my thesis. However, as the DPKO gender team numbers few people, full anonymity may be difficult to achieve. If it is important to you that the whole or parts of the interview be completely untraceable, I will take extra precautions. Should you wish to, you will also have final approval of all direct quotes I make use of in my text.

Participation in this interview is entirely voluntary and you may terminate the interview at any point. If there are questions you would rather not answer, that is fine.

The interview will last approximately 45 minutes, but I am flexible if this is inconvenient to you.

If you have questions regarding me or my project, please do not hesitate to contact me.

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## ***Appendix III b: Letter to Informants (Norwegian)***

Først vil jeg benytte anledningen til å takke for at du stiller opp til intervju.

Dette intervjuet blir en del av datamaterialet til den avsluttende oppgaven jeg skriver som en del av mastergraden min i Peace and Conflict Studies ved Universitet i Oslo. Jeg er også studentstipendiat ved Norsk Utenrikspolitisk Institutt (NUPI).

Målet med masteroppgaven er å få oversikt over hvordan ansatte i FNs Department of Peacekeeping Operations' (DPKO) Gender Team arbeider med implementeringen av FNs sikkerhetsråds resolusjoner om kvinner, fred og sikkerhet. Jeg ønsker særlig å fokusere på hvordan DPKO samarbeider med troppebidragsland, donorland, samt andre deler av FN-byråkratiet for å oppnå dette. Jeg vil også undersøke hvordan medlemmene i Gender Teamet ser sin egen innflytelse på denne prosessen.

For ikke å gå glipp av viktige momenter i intervjuet vil jeg be deg om å få gjøre lydopptak av samtalen vår. Disse opptakene vil bli transkribert. Både opptakene og transkripsjonen vil slettes når oppgaven er levert og sensur er gitt. Den ferdige oppgaven vil være tilgjengelig på universitetets bibliotek, samt publiseres på internett.

Jeg vil gjøre mitt beste for å bevare anonymiteten til de som lar seg intervjuet til denne oppgaven. Hverken mine notater, lydopptaket eller transkripsjonen vil derfor inneholde navnet på den som blir intervjuet. Miljøet som arbeider med spørsmål innenfor kvinner, fred og sikkerhet er på den annen side så lite at full anonymitet kan bli vanskelig å oppnå. Dersom det er viktig for deg at alt eller deler av du forteller under intervjuet ikke kan spores tilbake til deg, vil jeg ta spesielt hensyn til dette i den videre skriveprosessen. Dersom det er ønskelig er det selvsagt mulig å ta sitatsjekk. Du kan også unnlate å svare på enkeltspørsmål eller avslutte intervjuet når du måtte ønske.

Intervjuet vil vare rundt 45 minutter.

Dersom du skulle ha flere spørsmål om meg eller prosjektet, så ikke nøl med å ta kontakt.

Med vennlig hilsen,

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